United States v. Gaston Saunders, 828 F.3d 198

Background

Four commercial boat captains (Saunders, B. Daniels, Potter, S. Daniels) were indicted under the Lacey Act for catching Atlantic striped bass in the EEZ (federal waters) in 2009–2010 and selling them.
The Lacey Act criminalizes sale/transport of fish taken in violation of a U.S. law or regulation; convictions require proof of knowledge and a $350 market-value threshold.
The Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act (Bass Act) divides authority: the Secretary of Commerce regulates the EEZ; the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) prepares a plan for state coastal waters (0–3 miles) and monitors state compliance.
The Lacey Act exempts activity “regulated by a fishery management plan in effect under” the Magnuson‑Stevens Act (regional council/federal plans), a statutory framework distinct from the Commission’s interstate-compact plan.
The district court dismissed the indictments, holding the Commission’s plan functioned as a Magnuson‑Stevens Act plan (thereby exempting the captains) because it purportedly authorized the Secretary’s EEZ regulation; the government appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed: the Commission’s plan explicitly excludes the EEZ and does not (and cannot) grant regulatory authority over federal waters to the Secretary; indictments must be reinstated.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Commission's plan is a "fishery management plan in effect under" the Magnuson‑Stevens Act entitling defendants to the Lacey Act exemption	Captains: The Commission’s plan (as referenced in the Bass Act) functions as a plan in effect and thus exempts them from Lacey Act prosecution	Government: The Commission’s plan is not a Magnuson‑Stevens Act plan and does not regulate EEZ fishing; the Secretary’s regulation rests on Bass Act authority	Held: Plan is not a Magnuson‑Stevens plan and does not regulate EEZ; Lacey Act exemption does not apply
Whether the Commission’s plan authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to regulate EEZ striped bass fishing	Captains: Plan authorizes/vests authority in Secretary to regulate EEZ, making the Secretary’s rule an implementation of the plan	Government: Secretary’s authority flows from the Bass Act, not from any delegation by the Commission	Held: The plan merely acknowledges the Secretary’s independent Bass Act authority; it does not grant or authorize regulation of EEZ
Whether the Commission (an interstate compact body) can delegate regulatory authority over federal waters to the Secretary	Captains: Implicitly treated the Commission as supplying authority to Secretary	Government: The Commission, being a states’ compact entity, cannot confer federal regulatory power	Held: Commission cannot delegate federal regulatory power; any supposed authorization would be legally meaningless
Whether the statutory/regulatory scheme is unconstitutionally vague	Captains: Complexity of statutes/plans/regulations deprived them of fair notice	Government: Scheme is comprehensible; scienter and industry knowledge mitigate vagueness concerns	Held: Not unconstitutionally vague; complexity alone does not doom statute and scienter requirements provide fair notice

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Good, 326 F.3d 589 (4th Cir.) (standard of de novo review for dismissal of indictments)
New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n, 609 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2010) (Commission is an interstate-compact entity, not a federal agency)
United States v. Zhi Yong Guo, 634 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.) (complex regulatory schemes do not automatically render statutes unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir.) (a statute need not have "celestial precision"; vagueness test principles)
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness standard)
United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir.) (vagueness framework and role of scienter in defeating vagueness challenges)