United States v. Garcia
690 F. App'x 575
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Garcia pleaded guilty (2004, Texas) to attempted sexual assault of his 14-year-old stepdaughter; served prison and probation and completed some sex-offender treatment (details unclear).
- Between 2011–2013 Garcia failed to maintain sex-offender registration (moved to Colorado); convicted federally (18 U.S.C. §2250) in 2013 for failure to register, sentenced to 12 months + 5 years supervised release with sex-offender special conditions (treatment, computer restrictions, no unsupervised contact with minors).
- While on supervised release Garcia repeatedly violated conditions: failed treatment participation, secretive/unapproved travel, omitted truthful reporting, unauthorized contact with minors; RSA (treatment provider) terminated him and assessed elevated risk.
- District court revoked release twice, imposed prison terms and reimposed special sex-offender conditions including treatment (with potential polygraph/monitoring), computer monitoring, restricted association with minors (permitting probation officer to authorize limited contact), and RRC placement.
- Garcia appealed, arguing (1) the sex-offender special conditions were unreasonable given remoteness of the original offense and his history, and (2) unconstitutional delegation of sentencing authority to RSA (a private treatment provider). The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Garcia's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by imposing special sex-offender conditions of supervised release | Conditions are unjustified because original sex offense was a single incident 11–12 years earlier, he completed prior treatment, and conditions (esp. limits on seeing his children) unduly infringe familial association | Conditions were reasonably related to offense, Garcia’s recent failures to register and repeated noncompliance with treatment, RSA risk assessment, and public protection/deterrence justify conditions | Affirmed: conditions reasonably related to §3583(d) factors; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether sentencing authority was unconstitutionally delegated to RSA by conditioning release on "successful" completion of RSA treatment and compliance with its rules | RSA (a private, nonjudicial actor) was given effective control over Garcia’s movement and associations, creating an unlawful delegation and risk of arbitrary deprivation of liberty | RSA’s role is treatment/expert discretion; conditions require disclosure and compliance but do not allow RSA to set punishment; probation officer and court retain ultimate supervisory authority | Affirmed: no plain error; delegation did not vest RSA with power to decide the nature or extent of punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) (limits on sex-offender conditions and scrutiny of temporal remoteness)
- United States v. Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2012) (interim failure-to-register convictions and defendant background relevant to imposing sex-offender conditions)
- United States v. Burns, 775 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) (conditions limiting contact with one’s children valid only when defendant found dangerous to children)
- United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for special conditions of supervised release)
- United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing permissible ministerial delegations from impermissible delegations that determine punishment)
- United States v. Wireman, 849 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2017) (plain-error review framework)
- United States v. Marquez, 833 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2016) (plain-error standard application)