United States v. García-Pagán, 804 F.3d 121

Background

In Feb 2013 three masked, armed men invaded Dr. De León’s home in Puerto Rico, terrorized him and his 12‑year‑old son, stole cash and electronics, tied them up, and left in De León’s car.\
De León saw the assailants unmasked for a time and identified Garcia from a nine‑photo array within minutes and again at trial; he described Garcia as one of the three and identified co‑defendant Urbina‑Robles as the leader.\
Garcia presented an alibi (wife, mother, friend testimony) that he was home after a movie the night of the crime.\
After close of evidence but before closing arguments, defense counsel sought a continuance to file for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to secure Urbina’s in‑court testimony; the district court denied the continuance.\
Jury convicted Garcia of carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); the court sentenced Garcia to 420 months, five years more than Urbina’s 360‑month sentence (Urbina pled guilty).\
Garcia appealed, arguing (1) denial of continuance violated his Sixth Amendment compulsory‑process rights, (2) his longer sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed and dismissed ineffective‑assistance claims without prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Denial of continuance to seek writ for co‑defendant’s testimony (compulsory process)	Garcia: denial deprived him of Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; Urbina’s testimony was important to alibi/identification defense	Govt/District Ct: request was made very late; uncertain Urbina would waive Fifth; counsel had opportunities earlier; testimony likely cumulative to victim ID	Affirmed — no abuse of discretion. Late request, doubtful witness cooperation, and strong victim ID justified denial.
Sentencing disparity (procedural reasonableness)	Garcia: court failed to explain why he received 5 years more than Urbina	District Ct: relied on distinction that Garcia went to trial while Urbina pled guilty (cited Ayala‑Vázquez)	Affirmed — explanation can be inferred; plea/trial distinction is a valid sentencing factor.
Sentencing disparity (substantive reasonableness)	Garcia: five‑year greater sentence is substantively unreasonable	Govt: co‑conspirators who pled guilty are not similarly situated; plea signals acceptance of responsibility and prospects for rehabilitation	Affirmed — disparity not substantively unreasonable given plea vs. trial distinction and plausible sentencing rationale.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to seek timely writ; sentencing arguments)	Garcia: counsel was deficient and prejudice resulted	Govt/District Ct: such claims require development in first instance on §2255 collateral review	Dismissed without prejudice — not manifestly apparent on record; should be raised under §2255 so trial court can resolve facts.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Ayala‑Vázquez, 751 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (trial vs. guilty‑plea distinction can justify disparate sentences)
United States v. Alejandro‑Montañez, 778 F.3d 352 (1st Cir. 2015) (same; sentence disparity permissible where co‑conspirators pled guilty)
Blaikie v. Callahan, 691 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1982) (standard for showing necessity of continuance after close of evidence)
United States v. De‑Cologero, 530 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of continuance denials implicating Sixth Amendment)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (guilty plea shows acceptance of responsibility and can warrant leniency)
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (U.S. 1989) (after trial, plea‑based leniency factors no longer apply)
United States v. Pol‑Flores, 644 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (substantive‑reasonableness review requires a plausible sentencing rationale)
United States v. Rodriguez, 675 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (ineffective assistance claims ordinarily must be presented first to the trial court)