United States v. Galvin Gibson
19-56249
| 9th Cir. | Sep 7, 2021Background
- Galvin Gibson was convicted at a second trial after a first trial ended in a hung jury; he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion attacking the conviction and sentence.
- Gibson raised Brady and Napue claims (suppression of exculpatory evidence / use of false testimony) tied to the first trial.
- He also raised ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims: (1) sentencing counsel failed to object to a six-level ransom enhancement based on the applicable standard of proof, and (2) appellate counsel failed to press the enhancement on direct appeal.
- The district court denied the § 2255 motion, concluding the Brady/Napue claims were barred by issues decided on direct appeal and deeming the sentencing IAC claim procedurally defaulted.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, held the district court erred to the extent it treated the IAC claim as procedurally defaulted (Massaro), but affirmed on the alternative ground that Gibson suffered no Strickland prejudice because the ransom-enhancement evidence was at least clear and convincing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady/Napue claims arising from first trial | Gibson: Brady and Napue violations warrant relief from conviction/sentence | Gov't: Claims were raised and rejected on direct appeal (thus barred); if not, they are procedurally defaulted and Gibson shows no cause/prejudice | Claims barred or procedurally defaulted; Gibson failed to show cause and prejudice; denied |
| Procedural-default labeling of sentencing IAC | Gibson: IAC need not be raised on direct appeal (Massaro) so §2255 is proper | District court: treated sentencing IAC as procedurally defaulted | Court: district court erred to label IAC defaulted, but can affirm on lack of prejudice |
| Sentencing counsel IAC re: ransom enhancement standard of proof | Gibson: Counsel should have objected to use of preponderance instead of clear and convincing evidence for enhancement | Gov't: Even if standard error, enhancement supported by clear and convincing (indeed uncontroverted) evidence | No Strickland prejudice; enhancement proper; IAC claim fails |
| Appellate counsel IAC for not raising enhancement on direct appeal | Gibson: Appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise the enhancement issue | Gov't: Failure caused no prejudice because evidence overwhelmingly supported enhancement | Denied for lack of prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (use of known false testimony by prosecution violates due process)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (IAC claims may be raised in §2255 proceedings even if not raised on direct appeal)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (procedural default requires showing of cause and prejudice to obtain review)
- United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1985) (issues raised and rejected on direct appeal are barred in §2255 proceedings)
- United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2012) (appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by the record)
- United States v. Gibson, [citation="598 F. App'x 487"] (9th Cir. 2015) (direct appeal found uncontroverted evidence supporting Gibson's involvement in ransom demands)