United States v. Gadsden, 982 F.3d 106

In 2007 Gadsden was convicted of conspiring to distribute and distributing crack cocaine; as a prior drug felon he faced the then-mandatory 20 years to life statutory range based on findings that he was responsible for ~1.5 kg of crack. He was ultimately sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment after resentencing.
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the crack threshold triggering the harsher statutory range (from 50 g to 280 g); it was not initially retroactive. The First Step Act §404 (2018) authorized district courts to reduce sentences retroactively for offenses covered by the Fair Sentencing Act.
Gadsden moved under §404 in 2019. The government argued he was ineligible because the drug-quantity findings (≈1.5 kg) exceeded the new 280 g threshold; alternatively it argued the court should deny relief in its discretion.
Judge Preska denied Gadsden’s §404 motion without resolving eligibility, concluding a reduction was unwarranted based on (among other things) Gadsden’s violent history, post-conviction exemplary conduct, the fact his existing sentence was already below applicable Guidelines, and Judge Robinson’s prior statement that 262 months was the lowest reasonable sentence.
On appeal the government conceded (and this court’s precedent confirmed) that Gadsden was eligible under §404, but the Second Circuit affirmed because the district court did not abuse its discretion and was not required to hold a hearing at which Gadsden was physically present.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gadsden)	Defendant's Argument (Government / District Court)	Held
Whether Gadsden was eligible for §404 relief	§404 applies to him; Fair Sentencing Act changes cover his offense	Initially argued ineligible because sentencing quantity (≈1.5 kg) exceeds the new 280 g threshold	Court: Gadsden is eligible (gov’t conceded; Davis)
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a §404 reduction	Judge Preska over-relied on the fact his sentence was below Guidelines and on Judge Robinson’s prior remarks; failed to consider all §3553(a) factors and disparity with co-defendants	District court weighed relevant factors (violent history, exemplary incarceration conduct, below-Guidelines sentence, prior judge’s view) and acted within discretion	Court: No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed
Whether Gadsden was entitled to a hearing at which he was present	A full resentencing-type proceeding (or presence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43) was required when exercising sentencing discretion under §404	§404 contains no categorical right to a plenary resentencing or to the defendant’s physical presence; courts may deny without a hearing	Court: No categorical right to a hearing or presence; denial without such a hearing was permissible

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (addressing sentencing discretion in crack/powder disparity)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (timing and application of Fair Sentencing Act)
United States v. Davis, 961 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (defendant in Gadsden’s position is eligible for §404 relief)
United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (standard of review for discretionary §404 denials — abuse of discretion)
United States v. Preacely, 628 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (presumption that sentencing judge understood available options)
United States v. Figueroa, 714 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 2013) (denial of a sentence-reduction motion does not always require a full resentencing hearing)
United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (Section 404 does not require a plenary resentencing or defendant’s presence)
United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2019) (same conclusion regarding no mandatory hearing for §404 motions)