United States v. Fuller
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454
D. Neb.2014Background
- Defendant faced a statutory mandatory minimum of 5 years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and had sentencing pending.
- Defendant moved to continue sentencing indefinitely pending Congress’s consideration of two sets of bills (Smarter Sentencing Act and Justice Safety Valve Act) that could reduce mandatory minima or permit below-minimum sentences.
- Defendant argued the bills might be enacted and retroactively apply, potentially lowering his sentence.
- Court recognized the bills were at an early stage (referred to committee) and were mutually exclusive in parts, so outcome and timing were speculative.
- Court cited statutory and Supreme Court authority limiting retroactivity of ameliorative criminal statutes (1 U.S.C. § 109 and related case law).
- Court denied the continuance, concluding speculation about pending legislation does not justify indefinite delay and Rule 32(b) requires sentencing without unnecessary delay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing should be continued pending possible enactment of legislation | Fuller: delay until Congress acts could reduce or permit below-minimum sentence | Court: defendant asked for effectively indefinite continuance based on speculative legislation | Denied — speculative pending legislation does not justify delay |
| Whether proposed statutes might apply retroactively to pre-Act offenders | Fuller: unclear whether enacted changes would be retroactive; thus delay warranted | Court: general presumption bars retroactive application absent express Congressional intent | No basis to assume retroactivity; defendant’s argument fails |
| Whether ongoing legislative proposals create sufficient likelihood of changed sentencing law to warrant continuance | Fuller: pending bills could materially affect sentence | Court: bills were at committee stage, possibly mutually exclusive, and uncertain in form and timing | Too speculative and remote to justify postponing sentencing |
| Whether Rule 32(b) permits indefinite delay for potential future favorable legislation | Fuller: awaiting beneficial changes is appropriate | Court: Rule 32(b) requires sentencing without unnecessary delay; indefinite waits would disrupt administration of justice | Rule 32(b) supports prompt sentencing; continuance denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (1 U.S.C. § 109 bars applying ameliorative criminal statutes retroactively absent express provision)
- Martin v. United States, 989 F.2d 271 (1993) (discusses limits on retroactive application of changed criminal penalties)
- Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (penalties are "incurred" when offender commits the conduct; reductions generally not retroactive absent clear Congressional intent)
- United States v. Fields, 699 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (pending legislation is generally too remote to consider at sentencing)
- United States v. Lawrence, 662 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (courts should not delay sentencing for uncertain future congressional action)