United States v. Fulks
4:02-cr-00992
D.S.C.Aug 21, 2013Background
- Brandon Leon Basham filed a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; the court previously denied relief in a lengthy June 5, 2013 order.
- Basham moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the court mischaracterized Claims 11 and 15.
- Claim 11: Basham alleges the government had an affirmative Napue/Giglio duty to correct testimony (Sheriff Hewett) it knew or should have known was false concerning demonstration of a purse strap used on victim Alice Donovan.
- Claim 15: Basham alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to admission of evidence about the Samantha Burns abduction/murder three days before Donovan’s murder.
- The court reaffirmed its procedural-default finding as to Claim 11 but addressed the merits anyway, finding Basham failed to show Hewett’s testimony was false or that the government knew of falsity.
- The court also held counsel were not ineffective regarding the Burns evidence: any objection would have been overruled, and counsel reasonably “front loaded” the evidence as a strategic choice to lessen penalty-phase impact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government violated Napue/Giglio by failing to correct false testimony (Claim 11) | Government had an obligation to correct testimony it knew or should have known was false about who used the strap | Government contends testimony was not shown to be false and did not adopt a version blaming Basham; no evidence of perjury or knowledge of falsity | Court: Claim procedurally defaulted; on merits Basham failed to show testimony was false or that govt knew it was false, so Napue/Giglio claim fails |
| Whether "should have known" standard applies or court improperly limited Napue to knowing use of false testimony | Argues court erred by not considering "should have known" (Kelly standard) | Govt notes petitioner did not plead "should have known" in original §2255 claim and threshold falsity not shown | Court: No need to reach "should have known" because falsity not established; original pleading did not assert that theory |
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to Burns evidence (Claim 15) | Counsel ineffective for not objecting to admission of Samantha Burns evidence in guilt phase | Govt and record: Burns evidence admissible under Rule 404(b); failure to object caused no Strickland prejudice; counsel had strategic reasons to admit early | Court: Counsel not ineffective — objection would have been overruled and counsel reasonably front‑loaded evidence to reduce penalty‑phase impact |
| Whether Burns evidence had to be proved as involuntary disappearance | Basham asserts he never claimed Burns was a runaway, so govt need not prove involuntariness | Govt: No formal stipulation that Burns was kidnapped/killed; proving disappearance was involuntary was necessary | Court: Agrees government needed to prove involuntariness; Burns evidence admissible and relevant to intent/404(b) issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution must not knowingly use false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor’s failure to disclose impeachment information can warrant relief)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel; may dispose on prejudice prong)
- United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004) (three‑part test for Napue/Giglio claims in Fourth Circuit)
- United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929 (4th Cir. 1994) (discusses government knowledge versus constructive knowledge standards)
- Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985) (reviewing courts should not second‑guess reasonable strategic decisions by defense counsel)