United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268

Julia Frias, a convicted felon, was arrested after a vehicle chase in Denver where officers later found a revolver and matching ammunition in her car; she was in state custody on murder-related charges and was indicted federally for being a felon in possession of a firearm on December 15, 2014.
The federal indictment was sealed; Frias remained in state custody, cooperated with state authorities, and pled guilty to accessory to murder on September 24, 2015; the state plea said the state sentence should run concurrently with any potential federal sentence.
The federal government took custody of Frias on December 19, 2016 (about two years after indictment and nine months after state sentencing); she then moved to dismiss the federal indictment for violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
The district court found three Barker factors favored Frias but denied dismissal for lack of demonstrable prejudice; at trial the disputed issue was whether Frias constructively possessed the gun/ammunition.
During deliberations the jury asked if mere knowledge of the gun in the vehicle satisfies § 922(g)(1); the court referred the jury back to its instructions rather than answering directly; the jury convicted Frias.
Frias appealed, arguing speedy-trial violation, improper response to the jury question, and an erroneous instruction on burden of proof; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Speedy-trial violation under Sixth Amendment	Frias: two-year delay (nine months post-state sentence) violated her right; she could not assert the right earlier because indictment was sealed and she was unaware	Government: delay was to allow state prosecution to proceed; any remaining delay was not prejudicial	Court: first three Barker factors favor Frias, but no prejudice shown; no Sixth Amendment violation
Jury question on knowledge vs. possession	Frias: court should have answered "No" because knowledge alone doesn’t prove constructive possession per Little	Government: returning jury to full, correct instructions was adequate	Court: referring jury to complete instructions was reasonable; no abuse of discretion
Instruction on government’s burden of proof	Frias: instruction allegedly improper (preserved for Supreme Court review)	Government: Petty controls; instruction consistent with precedent	Court: bound by United States v. Petty; no reversible error
Prejudice from delayed prosecution affecting state sentencing/parole	Frias: delay thwarted chance to seek state sentence modification and affected parole eligibility	Government: constitutional speedy-trial prejudice requires showing impairment to defense or special harm; these were not shown	Court: these consequences do not constitute the required prejudice for Sixth Amendment relief

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (framework of four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2004) (speedy-trial right attaches at arrest or indictment)
Seltzer v. United States, 595 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2010) (waiting for another sovereign’s prosecution may justify delay only in specific circumstances)
Gould v. United States, 672 F.3d 930 (10th Cir. 2012) (prejudice is a key requirement in speedy-trial claims)
Batie v. United States, 433 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2006) (delays approaching one year are presumptively prejudicial)
United States v. Little, 829 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2016) (definition of constructive possession: power and intent to exercise dominion or control)
United States v. Petty, 856 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2017) (governs permissible burden-of-proof instruction in this circuit)