United States v. Freeman
650 F.3d 673
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- Five-week trial of Rondell Freeman and three codefendants on drug-trafficking charges; ten defendants pled guilty, five went to trial with four convictions including conspiracy.
- Government relied on cooperating witness Seneca Williams, whose penthouse-era testimony connected Wilbourn to Freeman’s operation; Wilbourn had a prison alibi for that period.
- Government knew Williams’s penthouse testimony was problematic; Wilbourn’s attorney warned prosecutors about Williams’s timeline; prosecutors did not resolve the issue before trial.
- A stipulation during trial established Wilbourn was incarcerated from 2002 to 2005, contradicting Williams’s penthouse account; the stipulation was read to the jury twelve days after Williams testified.
- Closing arguments emphasized Williams’s claimed truthfulness about the penthouse, while downplaying the date discrepancy; the district court terming this prosecutorial misconduct.
- District court granted a new trial: on count 1 (conspiracy) for all defendants, and on counts 10–11 for specific defendants due to prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony affecting the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the government knowingly use false testimony? | Freeman et al. argue Williams’s testimony was false and the government knew or should have known. | Government contends Napue applicability limited to verifiable truth; argues Williams’s statements were competing inferences, not conclusively false. | Yes; the government knowingly used false testimony. |
| Did the district court properly find false testimony and knowledge? | Waived? (Not specified; focus on knowledge and falsity.) | Government claims no knowledge or failure to establish falsehood as required. | District court did not err in finding false testimony and knowledge. |
| Was there a reasonable likelihood the false testimony affected the verdict? | Williams’s false penthouse testimony significantly aided conspiracy proof. | Evidence was overwhelming; transcript shows strong independent proof apart from Williams. | Yes; there was a reasonable likelihood the false testimony affected the conspiracy verdict. |
| Did prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments warrant new trials on related counts? | Closing remarks bolstered false testimony and misrepresented evidence. | Any misconduct cured by stipulation or other curative measures; no prejudice. | Yes; new trials were warranted for counts 10 and 11 due to prosecutorial misconduct. |
| Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting the new trials overall? | District court appropriately remedied due-process violations due to false testimony. | Discretionary rulings were improper given evidentiary strength. | No; district court did not abuse its discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution cannot knowingly use false testimony)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality and due process in false testimony)
- United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1995) ( three-part Napue standard for new trial)
- United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2009) (abuse of discretion standard of review)
- United States v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (materiality under Agurs/Griffin framework)
- Griffin v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2010) (materiality standard for false testimony on due process)
- United States v. Williams, 625 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (assessment of prosecutorial evidence and impact on verdict)
- United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000) (two-part inquiry for prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice)
- United States v. Serfling, 504 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2007) (prosecutorial misconduct prejudice factors)
- United States v. Morris, 498 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (definition of materiality and impact of false testimony)