United States v. Frederickson, 988 F.3d 76

Background

Daniel Frederickson was on supervised release after 2017 federal drug convictions that required urine testing and prohibited new crimes.
On Aug. 20, 2019, during a scheduled urine test at the U.S. Probation Office, Frederickson and intern Paul Walter had a confrontation; Walter testified Frederickson struck and then choked him; Frederickson testified Walter had made sexual comments and touched him, prompting a punch and a struggle. Officer Ryan Skal corroborated seeing Frederickson on top of Walter choking him. Photographs and medical records documented Walter’s injuries.
Frederickson was criminally charged with assaulting a federal employee (18 U.S.C. § 111); after a 3-day jury trial in Dec. 2019, a jury acquitted him. The government nonetheless pursued supervised-release revocation for the same conduct.
At the revocation hearing the district court applied the jury self-defense instruction but used the lower preponderance standard and found by a preponderance that Frederickson was not acting in lawful self-defense and had committed assault (both federal and state theories). The court revoked supervised release and imposed the statutory maximum: 24 months imprisonment plus 8 months supervised release.
On appeal Frederickson argued (1) collateral estoppel/double jeopardy barred using acquitted conduct at revocation; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove violation by a preponderance; and (3) the sentence was unreasonable. The First Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Frederickson's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Use of acquitted conduct at revocation (collateral estoppel/double jeopardy)	Acquitted conduct cannot be used to revoke because jury verdict precludes relitigation.	Collateral estoppel does not bar use of acquitted conduct at revocation because revocation uses a lower (preponderance) standard; Watts governs.	Rejected Frederickson: court may consider acquitted conduct at revocation under the lower standard.
Effect of jury acquittal based on self-defense	Jury necessarily found self-defense, so revocation on same facts is precluded.	Acquittal means government failed to disprove self-defense beyond reasonable doubt, but revocation requires only preponderance; jury rationale is uncertain.	Rejected Frederickson: acquittal does not preclude relitigation under preponderance standard.
Sufficiency of evidence to show violation and disprove self-defense	Evidence inconsistencies and medical-record gaps undermine finding that Frederickson used excessive force.	Trial testimony, officer eyewitness, photos, and records corroborate a prolonged, excessive assault beyond lawful self-defense.	Affirmed: district court’s credibility choices and finding that assault exceeded lawful self-defense are not clearly erroneous.
Reasonableness of sentence (procedural/substantive)	Sentence excessive; court failed to resolve factual conflicts and overemphasized deterrence/protection.	Court considered § 3553(a) factors, cited violent history and prior revocations, and provided a plausible rationale for upward variance to statutory maximum.	Affirmed: court adequately considered relevant factors and imposed a defensible, substantively reasonable sentence.

Key Cases Cited

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (establishes collateral estoppel principles under Double Jeopardy)
Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (acquittal does not bar relitigation at sentencing or other proceedings governed by lower proof standard)
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (limits preclusive effect of acquittals)
Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018) (explains when jury necessarily resolved an issue in defendant's favor)
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) (discusses what constitutes a jury's necessary factual finding)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation procedures and conditional liberty framework)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (preponderance standard applicable to supervised-release revocation)
United States v. Marino, 833 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016) (standard of review and evidentiary posture for revocation sufficiency)
Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 38 (2007) (reasonableness review framework for sentencing)
United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (requires particularized explanation for significant upward variances)