United States v. Freddie Wilson
788 F.3d 1298
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Freddie Wilson operated Against All Odds Bail Bonds and opened a Hancock Bank account to run a check-cashing business; between June–September 2012 he deposited ~37 U.S. Treasury tax-refund checks (~$333,000) into that account and used the funds largely for personal expenses.
- Wilson’s state check-casher license application promised AML and record-keeping compliance but did not disclose the Hancock account; his storefront lacked required records, cameras, thumbprints, or business operations consistent with a legitimate check-cashing business.
- IRS Special Agent Christian Daley concluded the deposited refund checks derived from fraudulent tax returns based on patterns (large/round amounts, duplicate amounts, neighboring addresses, absence of supporting 1099s) and linked additional uncharged checks in other accounts to the same scheme.
- Sherman Brown, a cooperating witness and convicted felon, testified he sold checks to Wilson, helped obtain SSNs, observed Wilson file false tax returns, and accompanied him to pick up checks. Wilson denied knowledge and claimed he was a victim.
- After agents seized boxes of records, Wilson removed original boxes from FedEx copies and returned them late and incomplete; text messages from Wilson’s former attorney to Agent Daley arranging return were admitted at trial.
- A jury convicted Wilson on 14 counts (the court later dismissed one aggravated-identity-theft count as to a misdemeanor), and the district court imposed a 102-month sentence, which included guideline increases for loss and number of victims that incorporated uncharged conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Wilson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for theft of government funds (18 U.S.C. §641) | Evidence did not prove Wilson knew checks were fraudulently issued or intended to steal funds | Account activity, personal spending, absence of required records, Brown’s testimony, and forged endorsements show knowing conversion | Evidence sufficient; conviction affirmed |
| Aggravated identity theft (§1028A): is a name/signature a “means of identification”? | A bare name (and no other identifier) cannot identify a specific individual under the statute | Statute defines “means of identification” to include “any name,” and forged endorsements/signatures are a person’s written name | Use of payee names and forged signatures qualifies as a means of identification; conviction affirmed |
| Obstruction of investigation (18 U.S.C. §1505): taking/withholding seized records | Proof at trial varied from indictment (charged taking; proof showed delayed return) and lacked corrupt intent | Withholding originals, false denials, and delayed/incomplete returns show corrupt intent and conversion; indictment covered taking/removal/conversion | Evidence supported corrupt intent; no prejudicial variance; conviction affirmed |
| Admission of contested evidence (Brown’s testimony; 31 uncharged returns/checks; Agent Daley’s opinion; attorney text messages) | Some evidence was prejudicial, hearsay, testimonial, or beyond scope | Evidence was intrinsic or admissible under 404(b); Daley’s opinion was based on records/patterns; texts were informal and non‑testimonial; agent and exhibits were properly admitted | District court acted within discretion; evidentiary rulings upheld |
| Sentencing: inclusion of uncharged checks in loss/victim counts | Court erred including uncharged checks and treating each name as a victim; some names might be fictitious | Sentencing may consider relevant uncharged conduct proved by preponderance; IRS patterns and common scheme support loss and victim count | District court’s factual findings sustained; loss and victim increases affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (knowing conversion requires knowledge of facts making taking unlawful)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements barred by Confrontation Clause absent prior opportunity for cross-examination)
- United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008) (forged signature constitutes use of a person’s name under §1028A)
- United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (contrasting view on whether a bare name suffices under §1028A)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (standards for judgment of acquittal and reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- United States v. Lanier, 920 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1991) (knowing use of government property to deprive government supports §641 conviction)
- United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (other‑acts evidence admissible when intrinsic to and explains the charged offense)
- United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014) (informal text messages may be non‑testimonial and not barred by Confrontation Clause)
- United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2013) (courts may infer IRS would not issue refunds to fictitious persons)