United States v. Frates
896 F.3d 93
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- David A. Frates pled guilty to one count of federal armed bank robbery and was classified as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §4B1.1, raising his guideline range to 188–235 months; the district court varied downward and sentenced him to 132 months.
- At sentencing (July 2016) the Guidelines defined “crime of violence” with a force clause, an enumerated-offenses clause, and a residual clause; that residual clause mirrored the ACCA residual clause.
- After Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the ACCA residual clause, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 798 (effective Nov. 1, 2016) removing the Guidelines’ residual clause; the Commission did not make the amendment retroactive.
- The Supreme Court later held in Beckles that the Guidelines’ residual clause is not subject to a vagueness challenge, leaving a transitional class of defendants sentenced under the now-deleted-but-still-applicable residual clause.
- Frates argued (1) his armed bank robbery conviction does not qualify under the force clause, and (2) his four Massachusetts unarmed-robbery priors do not qualify as crimes of violence (so the career-offender enhancement was improper).
- The First Circuit concluded the armed bank robbery conviction qualifies under the force clause (following Ellison) and that Massachusetts unarmed robbery qualifies under the then-applicable residual clause (following De Jesus), so the enhancement was properly applied. The court nevertheless vacated and remanded for resentencing under its Godin/Ahrendt discretion to allow the district court to consider the Commission’s revised policy (Amendment 798).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Frates) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal armed bank robbery (§2113) is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines' force clause | The statute requires a threat or use of bodily harm and thus fits the force clause | §2113 can be committed by non-force intimidation (e.g., poison, withholding medicine); intimidation can be unintentional; force requires intent | Held: conviction qualifies under the force clause; court follows Ellison holding that §2113 requires a threat of bodily harm and has an implicit general-intent element |
| Whether Massachusetts unarmed robbery priors qualify as crimes of violence under §4B1.2(a) | Government conceded these priors would not qualify under the force or enumerated clauses but argued they qualified under the (then-applicable) residual clause | Frates argued residual-clause methodology (ordinary-case) is invalid post-Johnson and De Jesus should be overruled | Held: Under binding precedent (De Jesus) and the ordinary-case method, Massachusetts unarmed robbery qualified under the residual clause; enhancement valid under the Guidelines as applied at sentencing |
| Whether the Sentencing Commission’s Amendment 798 requires vacatur/remand (Godin/Ahrendt doctrine) | Government opposed remand, citing precedent limits and noting the district court already varied downward | Frates sought remand so the district court could consider the Commission’s revised policy (which would have lowered his guideline range) | Held: Court exercised discretion under Godin/Ahrendt to vacate and remand for resentencing so the district court may consider Amendment 798 in its discretionary sentencing decision; original guideline calculation remains in effect |
| Whether remand is appropriate given the district court’s downward variance | Government argued the variance makes remand unnecessary | Frates argued the Commission’s different ‘‘anchor’’ could meaningfully affect discretionary sentencing | Held: Downward variance does not preclude remand; the Guidelines remain an important sentencing anchor and the district court may reconsider in light of the Commission’s changed policy |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (Guidelines residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)
- United States v. Godin (Godin II), 522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (vacatur/remand doctrine when Commission amends Guidelines during pending appeal)
- United States v. Ahrendt, 560 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Godin remand reasoning)
- United States v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2017) (§2113 robbery qualifies under force clause)
- United States v. Wurie, 867 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2017) (treatment of Amendment 798; limits on remand where analysis on remand would be complex)
- United States v. De Jesus, 984 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1993) (Massachusetts larceny-from-person/unarmed-robbery qualifies under residual clause)