United States v. Frank Chavez
673 F. App'x 754
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Frank Chavez was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) for being a felon in possession of a firearm after officers entered a house and found him in the living room.
- Officers entered the home after a third party, Sandra Rentfro, who was visiting her son (the homeowner) for his birthday, consented to their entry.
- At the time of entry officers knew Rentfro did not own or reside in the house, had come from out of town to visit, and that the homeowner and Chavez were present inside.
- Officers did not ask the homeowner or other resident for permission before entering and did not know whether Rentfro had keys, how often she stayed, what rooms she used, or whether she could invite guests.
- The district court denied Chavez’s suppression motion in part, finding Rentfro had apparent authority to consent; the Ninth Circuit majority reversed suppression denial and suppressed the evidence as fruit of an unlawful entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Chavez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there valid third-party consent to enter the home? | Officers reasonably believed Rentfro had authority to consent to entry of common areas. | Rentfro lacked actual or apparent authority because she neither owned nor lived at the home and officers had no facts showing shared use or control. | Reversed: No apparent authority — consent invalid; entry and evidence suppressed. |
| Was apparent authority measured objectively by facts known to officers at entry? | Officers point to Rentfro’s relationship to homeowner and visible common-area access as sufficient for an objectively reasonable belief. | Officers lacked key facts (keys, frequency of visits, ability to admit others) needed for a reasonable belief Rentfro had joint access/control. | Court: Apparent authority requires facts that would legally justify belief of authority; those facts were absent here. |
| Must government prove authority for each specific area searched? | Government relied on apparent authority for the home and living room. | Defendant argued government must show Rentfro had authority for those specific areas. | Court: Government bears burden to prove apparent authority to consent to each specific area searched; it failed here. |
| Were subsequent searches/seizures (pat-down, handcuffing) valid assuming entry lawful? | (Alternative) Officers acted within scope; pat-down was consensual and handcuffing did not convert to arrest. | (Preserved) Even if scope exceeded, evidence suppression required because initial entry unlawful. | Court did not reach alternatives because entry was unlawful; dissent would have upheld pat-down and detention. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Arreguin, 735 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2013) (apparent-authority standard; government must show authority for each area searched)
- United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993) (apparent authority requires officers’ reasonable belief in third party’s actual authority)
- United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (warrantless home entry is per se unreasonable absent exigency or consent)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (scope of search defined by its expressed object)
- United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (fruit of the poisonous tree suppression principle)