United States v. Francisco Castro-Alfonso
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19398
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Castro‑Alfonso pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326) after a 2006 deportation that followed a Tennessee aggravated burglary conviction under Tenn. Code § 39‑14‑403.
- The PSR recommended a 16‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the Tennessee conviction was deemed a "crime of violence."
- Castro‑Alfonso objected, arguing the Tennessee statute is broader than the generic "burglary of a dwelling" and does not require force.
- The government submitted the 2006 guilty plea colloquy in which Castro‑Alfonso admitted breaking into a Nashville residence.
- The district court applied the 16‑level enhancement (total offense level 21; guideline range 46–57 months) and sentenced him to 46 months, stating it would impose the same sentence even if the enhancement were erroneous.
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the Tennessee aggravated burglary fits the Guidelines' enumerated "burglary of a dwelling" definition and, alternatively, that any error was harmless because the district court would have imposed the same sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. Code § 39‑14‑403 is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 | § 39‑14‑403 is broader than generic burglary of a dwelling and covers non‑dwelling structures | The Tennessee statute parallels Texas law found to be burglary of a habitation and thus is an enumerated crime of violence | Held: § 39‑14‑403 qualifies as an enumerated "burglary of a dwelling" crime of violence under § 2L1.2 (affirmed) |
| Whether the categorical approach permits using the prior conviction for enhancement | Statute criminalizes non‑dwelling structures (too capacious) | Statutory language aligns with Texas statute in Garcia‑Mendez; ordinary meaning of dwelling includes appurtenant structures | Held: Categorical approach controlled by Garcia‑Mendez; statute equivalent to generic burglary of a dwelling |
| Whether the court may rely on the plea colloquy or must use modified categorical approach | Argues statute is indivisible; plea colloquy shouldn’t control categorical equivalence | Government used plea colloquy to show defendant admitted dwelling burglary; panel relied on Garcia‑Mendez precedent | Held: Court relied on Garcia‑Mendez and plea colloquy; enhancement sustained (categorical analysis controlled by precedent) |
| If calculation error occurred, whether it was harmless | Enhancement was improper and influenced sentence | District court explicitly stated it would impose same sentence even if enhancement were wrong | Held: Alternatively harmless error — district court would have imposed same sentence; affirmation stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Garcia‑Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2005) (held burglary of a habitation under Texas law is a "crime of violence" for § 2L1.2 enhancements)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established the generic definition of burglary for the categorical approach)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (explained the realistic‑probability test for categorical analysis)
- United States v. Albornoz‑Albornoz, 770 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluded ordinary meaning of "dwelling" includes appurtenant or connected structures)
- United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1996) (noted burglary of a habitation is considered a crime of violence)
- United States v. Ibarra‑Luna, 628 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2010) (articulated framework for harmless‑error review of sentencing calculation errors)