United States v. Francis Gerald Grady
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5697
7th Cir.2014Background
- Grady was convicted of arson and intentionally damaging the property of a reproductive health services facility.
- He admitted lighting the fire and damaging the Planned Parenthood clinic, stating his intent to damage the building.
- Grady bought gasoline, loaded it into a van and a bottle, then used it to start a fire at the clinic.
- The fire caused extensive damage and forced the clinic to cancel services for a day.
- The district court defined “maliciously” for 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) using the government’s proposed instruction.
- Grady appealed, arguing the district court erred in defining “maliciously” and rejected his preferred definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of maliciously under § 844(i) | Grady: define as intentionally causing damage without just cause | Grady’s proposed definition is invalid; government’s instruction is proper | No error; district court’s definition is correct |
| Omission of ‘without just cause or reason’ phrase | Grady argued McBride requires that phrase | No legal basis to include the phrase; evidence does not support justification | District court acted within discretion; omission is affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Swan, 250 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2000) (general review of jury instructions; de novo standard applied)
- United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (instructions review; final result must accurately state the law)
- United States v. Lee, 439 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2006) (discretion to craft instructions; final result governs)
- United States v. McBride, 724 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussion of malice in arson; supports rational district court instruction)
- United States v. Monroe, 178 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (definition of maliciously used in arson contexts)
- United States v. Wiktor, 146 F.3d 815 (10th Cir. 1998) (definition of maliciously in arson statute cited by circuits)
- United States v. Gullet, 75 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1996) (practice in defining malice in arson contexts)
- United States v. Whaley, 552 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009) (recognition of adopted circuit definitions in model jury instructions)