United States v. Fokker Services B.V.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6176
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Fokker Services (Dutch company) voluntarily disclosed potential violations of U.S. sanctions and export-control laws and cooperated with a multi-year investigation.
- Government negotiated a global settlement including an 18‑month Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA): one-count information filed, $21M in fines, continued cooperation, and compliance measures.
- Government and Fokker filed a joint motion to exclude the DPA period from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70‑day clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2).
- The district court denied the joint motion, criticizing the prosecution for not charging individual officers and for terms it viewed as too lenient (no independent monitor, fine not exceeding revenue, etc.).
- D.C. Circuit vacated the denial and granted mandamus: courts lack authority under § 3161(h)(2) to refuse approval of a DPA exclusion based on disagreement with prosecutorial charging decisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3161(h)(2) allows a district court to deny Speedy Trial Act exclusion because it disagrees with the prosecution’s charging or remedy choices | Fokker (and government jointly) argued the court should approve the exclusion so the DPA can run and charges be dismissed if conditions met | District court argued it could deny approval because the DPA was too lenient and prosecutors should have charged individuals and imposed different terms | Court held § 3161(h)(2) does not permit courts to second‑guess prosecutorial charging decisions; approval limited to ensuring DPA is bona fide to allow demonstration of good conduct |
| Scope of judicial "approval" under § 3161(h)(2) — whether it imports broad oversight of prosecutorial discretion | Government: approval is narrow—ensure DPA is not a pretext to evade speedy‑trial limits | District court: approval permits assessing adequacy of charges/remedies | Court held approval is limited: verify DPA’s bona fides and purpose (allowing defendant to demonstrate good conduct), not to impose court’s charging preferences |
| Availability of mandamus to correct denial of DPA time exclusion | Government: mandamus appropriate because interlocutory appeal is inadequate and final‑judgment appeal may foreclose relief | District court/Fokker: relief could await final judgment or normal appeal routes | Court found mandamus appropriate: interlocutory appeal unavailable, final‑judgment review inadequate or risky, and district court clearly erred |
| Whether reassignment of the case to a different judge was warranted | Fokker requested reassignment due to judge’s comments | Government did not seek reassignment | Court denied reassignment: judge’s comments did not show bias or inability to render fair judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (prosecutorial charging decisions presumptively discretionary; courts limited in second‑guessing)
- United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (whether to prosecute and what charge to bring rests with prosecutor)
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (courts not competent to review prosecutorial charging priorities; review would chill enforcement)
- United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (courts should not substitute their preferred remedies for the Executive’s; limited review of consent decrees)
- Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (standards for mandamus; remedy is extraordinary)
- Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mandamus framework in similar separation‑of‑powers contexts)