United States v. Figueroa-Ocasio
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17987
1st Cir.2015Background
- Figueroa was indicted on four firearms counts after a January 2012 traffic stop in San Juan: (1) felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), (2) possession of a stolen firearm (§ 922(j)), (3) possession of a machine/automatic gun (§ 922(o)), and (4) possession of a firearm in a school zone (§ 922(q)(2)(A)). Three Glock pistols were found in the vehicle; none on any defendant and ownership was not established.
- On March 1, 2012, Figueroa entered a straight guilty plea at a change-of-plea hearing conducted with an interpreter; the court accepted the plea without fully satisfying Rule 11 procedures and made no explicit on-the-record finding that the plea was knowing, voluntary, or supported by a factual basis.
- During the colloquy the district court misstated or diluted mens rea requirements for counts 2 and 4 (stolen-firearm and school-zone offenses), asked confusing compound questions, failed to explain aiding-and-abetting liability, and elicited an ambiguous nod rather than an explicit verbal plea.
- The Government’s factual proffer was thin: it only established that Figueroa was a passenger in a car where three firearms were found; it did not specifically allege knowledge, constructive possession, or awareness of stolen status or school-zone status.
- At sentencing the PSR grouped all counts and calculated an offense level producing a 57–71 month guideline range (CHC II). The district court nonetheless treated the § 922(q) count separately, imposed 71 months for counts 1–3 plus a consecutive 7 months for count 4 (total 78 months), and appeared to misunderstand grouping and the interplay of statutory maxima vs. guideline ranges.
- The First Circuit concluded the plea colloquy failed to establish a knowing, voluntary, and factually supported plea and that the sentencing calculation was procedurally erroneous; it vacated conviction and sentence and remanded to a different district judge for proper Rule 11 proceedings and further action.
Issues
| Issue | Figueroa's Argument | Government/District Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of plea colloquy under Rule 11 (knowing, voluntary, factual basis) | Plea was not knowingly or intelligently entered; court failed to explain elements or establish factual basis | Court proceeded with routine colloquy and accepted plea | Court: Plain error — plea not knowing/voluntary; vacated plea and remanded for new proceedings |
| Misstatement/dilution of mens rea for counts 2 and 4 | Court misstated scienter (suggesting mere possibility sufficed), undermining defendant’s understanding | Court characterized elements in simplified/common-sense terms | Court: Misstatements were plain error and prejudicial; may have induced plea |
| Constructive possession / factual sufficiency of proffer | Government’s proffer was too thin (mere presence in car insufficient to show possession or knowledge of stolen status) | Proffer plus colloquy sufficed to support plea acceptance | Court: Record lacked sufficient factual link to weapons or knowledge; reasonable probability plea would not have been entered absent errors |
| Sentencing grouping / calculation under Guidelines (§§ 3D1.1, 2K2.5, 3D1.2) | Court mis-grouped counts and improperly stacked a consecutive guideline term for § 922(q) on top of the group, producing an elevated total | Court treated § 922(q) as requiring a separate consecutive guideline calculation | Court: Plain error in guidelines calculation; sentencing procedurally erroneous; contributed to vacation of sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (vacatur where district court misstated mens rea in plea colloquy)
- United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (§ 922(j) requires knowledge or reasonable cause to believe firearm was stolen)
- United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (U.S. 2004) (standard for showing reasonable probability that, but for error, defendant would not have pleaded guilty)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (U.S. 2014) (aider-and-abettor liability requires advance knowledge of elements)
- United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492 (1st Cir. 2005) (mere presence or proximity to weapon insufficient to prove possession)
- United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (§ 922(q)(2)(A) requires knowledge or reasonable cause to believe one is in a school zone)