United States v. Feras Rahman
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19486
7th Cir.2015Background
- Early-morning fire (Jan. 19, 2010) destroyed a Milwaukee building housing the Black & White Café and other businesses; ATF investigator Rick Hankins joined the scene to determine the fire’s origin and cause.
- Owner Feras Rahman signed a written consent authorizing investigators to search the Café “to determine the origin and cause of the fire.”
- Rahman told investigators he kept a safe, business records, and a laptop (used for business records) in the basement office; investigators later found no safe or laptop in the basement.
- Investigators viewed surveillance video indicating the fire originated in or above the Café (not the basement), seized an alarm box, excavated the site, used an accelerant-detection canine, and eventually tested positive samples for gasoline.
- A red laptop was later recovered from Rahman’s home; it lacked business records. Rahman was acquitted of arson charges but convicted of making a false statement (18 U.S.C. § 1001) about the laptop’s location.
- On appeal, Rahman challenged (1) the admissibility of evidence from basement searches as exceeding his consent and (2) sufficiency of evidence supporting the false-statement conviction; the Seventh Circuit reversed suppression denials and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Rahman’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether searches of the basement exceeded the scope of Rahman’s written consent to search for the “origin and cause” of the fire | Consent limited to determining literal origin and spark; did not include searching for secondary/circumstantial evidence of arson | An objectively reasonable person would understand “origin and cause” to include arson investigation; consent covered the basement searches | Court: Much of the basement search exceeded consent once investigators had ruled out the basement as the origin; evidence seized thereafter should have been suppressed (alarm box exceptionized) |
| Whether the alarm box seizure was outside the scope of consent | Alarm box would only yield secondary evidence of arson and thus was outside consent | Alarm box could contain timestamp/data relevant to origin and cause; investigators had not ruled out the basement when seized | Court: Alarm box seizure was within scope and admissible because it could help determine origin/time and was seized before basement was ruled out |
| Whether the Davis good-faith exception saves the improperly scoped searches | N/A (Gov’t invoked Davis) | Investigators reasonably relied on Rahman’s consent and prevailing precedent | Court: Davis inapplicable because common-law trespass theory and Katz-based precedent constrained searches; good-faith exception does not save the evidence |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction for making a false statement about the laptop’s location | Government failed to negate reasonable, literal interpretations; Rahman may have referred to a different laptop | The red laptop seized at home lacked business records, supporting that Rahman lied about the laptop being in the Café | Court: §1001 jurisdiction element satisfied, but the proof was insufficient because the statement was ambiguous and not shown to be literally false beyond a reasonable doubt given possibility of another laptop; remand for proceedings consistent with suppression ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (distinguishes administrative fire-origin searches from criminal-arson searches and requires criminal warrant when primary object is gathering evidence of arson)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (Fourth Amendment protects people and reasonable expectations of privacy)
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (recognizes common-law trespass theory remains relevant alongside Katz privacy analysis)
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (Fourth Amendment property-based intrusion principles discussed)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent may preclude exclusionary rule but does not overcome longstanding trespass constraints here)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (scope of consent is defined by its expressed object and judged objectively)
- United States v. Long, 425 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005) (scope-of-consent and totality-of-circumstances test for consent searches)