United States v. Felipe Mendez, Jr.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11674
8th Cir.2017Background
- In July 2004 police arrested Felipe Mendez after a traffic stop and seized an automobile, multiple cash amounts ($4,800, $2,273, $10,632), and personal items; the car and $10,632 were later forfeited to Iowa.
- Mendez was convicted of a drug-trafficking conspiracy; the district court entered judgment on January 19, 2006, and this court affirmed on direct appeal on July 5, 2007.
- Mendez filed a § 2255 motion in 2009; the district court denied it in March 2012 and denial of a COA was affirmed in October 2012.
- Mendez filed a Rule 41(g) motion for return of property on January 25, 2016, seeking return of cash, the car (where not forfeited), and personal effects.
- The district court held the Rule 41(g) motion time-barred under the six-year catchall statute (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)), declined equitable tolling, and observed forfeited items could not be recovered; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the six-year limitations period for a post-judgment Rule 41(g) claim accrue? | Mendez: accrual occurred after completion of post-conviction § 2255 proceedings (2012), because property might remain needed if § 2255 succeeded. | Government: accrual occurs at entry of judgment (or at end of direct appeal); claimant had present right to return then. | Accrual occurs at judgment (or conclusion of criminal proceedings); Mendez’s 2016 motion was untimely. |
| Whether equitable tolling excuses the untimely filing | Mendez: negotiations with government and legal uncertainty about accrual tolled the limitations period. | Government: no extraordinary circumstances; negotiations began well after limitations expired; pro se mistakes insufficient. | Equitable tolling not warranted: no extraordinary circumstance prior to expiration and lack of diligence. |
| Whether forfeited property could be recovered in Rule 41(g) proceeding | Mendez: seek return of all seized property. | Government: property already forfeited to State of Iowa cannot be returned. | Forfeited items cannot be recovered through Rule 41(g). |
Key Cases Cited
- Zarecor v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 801 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of de novo review for timeliness questions)
- Earl v. Fabian, 556 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2009) (de novo review principles)
- Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2007) (post‑criminal Rule 41(g) treated as civil equitable action)
- Santiago‑Lugo v. United States, 538 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (claim accrues at end of criminal proceedings)
- Jackson v. United States, 526 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2008) (government justified to retain evidence while criminal proceedings pending)
- Loudner v. United States, 108 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 1997) (limitations period begins when claimant knew or with diligence should have known of claim)
- United States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2004) (limitations may run from expiration of statute of limitations for criminal/civil forfeiture only when no proceedings are pending)
- Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016) (equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstance plus diligence)
- Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 2004) (pro se misunderstanding of law does not justify equitable tolling)