United States v. Fausto Lopez
907 F.3d 472
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Police received a tip from an identified informant that a man named "Fausto" received cocaine in a white Chevrolet Malibu at a South Laflin Street garage; informant then stopped cooperating after leaving police custody.
- The next day officers surveilled the address, saw a white van (not a Malibu) pull up, and observed Lopez and his brother unload paper shopping bags into the garage.
- An officer with only a “hunch” ordered Lopez stopped as he drove away; officers boxed in his van, forced him out, frisked him, and searched his van with his consent but found no contraband.
- Officers retained Lopez’s van, keys, and cellphone, brought him back to the garage, and—after further questioning and two oral assurances he was not under arrest and was free to go—obtained consent to search the garage (nothing found) and then his house, where they discovered heroin, cash, and a firearm.
- Lopez was indicted, moved to suppress the evidence as the product of unreasonable search and seizure, lost in district court, pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal suppression, and appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of the suppression motion, holding the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion and, alternatively, the detention was unlawfully prolonged; either defect rendered Lopez’s consent involuntary and the house-search evidence inadmissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lopez) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to make the initial Terry stop | Tip was uncorroborated and informant became uncooperative; observed facts (paper bags, van) did not corroborate the tip; stop was based on a hunch | Tip was from an identified informant and included statements against penal interest; police corroborated name/address; tip sufficed to justify stop | No reasonable suspicion. Identified-but-unreliable informant required independent corroboration beyond easily obtained facts; stop was unjustified |
| Whether the frisk was lawful | Frisk was part of an unlawful seizure and no facts supported a fear for officer safety | Frisk can be reasonable in drug investigations because guns are associated with drug trade | Frisk unconstitutional. Even if stop justified, no basis to suspect Lopez was armed and dangerous; frisk contributed to coercive setting |
| Whether officers unlawfully prolonged the detention, vitiating consent | Officers retained van, keys, and cellphone and crowded the scene with multiple officers; verbal assurances did not negate objective detention; detention continued after garage search found nothing | Officer’s oral statements that Lopez was not under arrest and free to go meant he was not detained; consent cures prolongation | Detention unlawfully prolonged. Objective circumstances (retained property, multiple officers) made a reasonable person feel not free to leave; consent therefore not voluntary |
| Admissibility of evidence obtained after consent | Consent was tainted by unlawful seizure/frisk and prolonged detention; house-search evidence must be suppressed | Consent was voluntary; evidence admissible | Evidence suppressed. Stop and/or prolonged detention invalidated voluntariness of consent; reversal of denial of suppression and remand granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory-stop framework and limits)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (anonymous-tip reliability requirement for Terry stops)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for informant reliability)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (limits on prolonging traffic stops beyond mission)
- Hensley v. United States, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (Terry stops to investigate ongoing vs. past crimes)
- Florida v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (anonymous tip with predictive detail can create reasonable suspicion if corroborated)
- Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (tip from known, reliable informant may justify forcible stop)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (voluntariness and causal taint of evidence/statements obtained after unlawful seizure)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (detention in enclosed space and retention of ID can show seizure beyond voluntary encounter)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (frisk is a separate inquiry from a Terry stop)