United States v. Farmer
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24843
| 9th Cir. | 2010Background
- Farmer pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B) on November 3, 2008.
- The PSR noted a 1987 California Penal Code §288(a) conviction for lewd acts with a child under 14, and suggested it triggered §2252A(b)(2)’s 10-year mandatory minimum.
- District court relied on Baron-Medina and United States v. Sinerius to apply the ten-year minimum based on a finding that §288(a) categorically constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.
- Farmer challenged the ten-year mandatory minimum, arguing his California conviction does not categorically fit §2252A(b)(2)’s predicate offenses.
- The court applied Taylor v. United States’ method: define the federal generic offense and compare the state statute’s conduct to that definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California §288(a) falls within §2252A(b)(2)’s sexual abuse predicate. | Farmer argues §288(a) does not categorically relate to sexual abuse of a minor. | Farmer contends the state offense does not match the federal predicates; government argues it does. | Yes; §288(a) categorically relates to sexual abuse. |
| Whether Estrada-Espinoza overruled Sinerius for §2252A(b)(2) purposes. | Farmer asserts Estrada-Espinoza requires using §2243(a) definition and overrules Sinerius. | Government contends Estrada-Espinoza did not overrule Sinerius for §2252A(b)(2). | No; we remain bound by Sinerius; Estrada-Espinoza does not overrule it. |
| Whether two definitions of 'sexual abuse of a minor' coexist to govern §2252A(b)(2). | Farmer argues the two-definition approach is inconsistent and improper. | Government relies on Pelayo-Garcia and related cases allowing dual definitions. | Two definitions coexist; the state offense can qualify under at least one definition; no single uniform definitional cure appears appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (defined 'sexual abuse of a minor' for immigration and related contexts)
- Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (defined §2252A(b)(2) 'abusive sexual conduct' by ordinary meaning)
- Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognized dual definitions for 'sexual abuse of a minor' under different statutory schemes)
- Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (adopted two-definition approach to 'sexual abuse of a minor')
- Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010) (applied Pelayo-Garcia two-definition framework)
- Castro, 607 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2010) (continued development of 'sexual abuse of a minor' analysis under §2252A)
- Strickland, 601 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc reaffirmation of Sinerius approach for §2252A)
- Osborne, 551 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2009) (Seventh Circuit adopted view aligning §2252A with §2243(a) in Osborne)