United States v. Evans
924 F.3d 21
2d Cir.2019Background
- Ronald Evans pled guilty in 2011 to being a felon in possession of a firearm; he was initially sentenced under ACCA to 180 months based on three prior "violent felony" convictions.
- After Johnson invalidated ACCA's residual clause, the district court found one prior predicate (NY attempted burglary) no longer qualified and resentenced Evans, considering whether other prior convictions still qualified.
- At resentencing the court treated three prior convictions as potential ACCA predicates: (1) 1982 federal bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), (2) 1983 armed bank robbery (§ 2113(d)) (conceded qualifying), and (3) 2001 North Carolina second-degree burglary (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51).
- The district court held that federal bank robbery and NC second-degree burglary each qualified as ACCA predicates; it reimposed the 180-month ACCA sentence.
- On appeal the Second Circuit considered two questions of first impression in the circuit: whether NC second-degree burglary is an ACCA "enumerated" burglary and whether federal bank robbery (§ 2113(a)) qualifies under ACCA's elements clause as a crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Evans) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NC second-degree burglary (§ 14-51) qualifies as ACCA "burglary" (enumerated clause) | § 14-51 is broader than "generic burglary" because it can cover mobile structures and thus may exceed generic burglary | NC second-degree burglary limits burglary to dwelling/sleeping apartments (including mobile structures used for lodging), matching generic burglary | Yes — NC second-degree burglary categorically fits generic burglary and is an ACCA enumerated violent felony |
| Whether federal bank robbery (§ 2113(a)) qualifies under ACCA's elements clause (use/threat of physical force) | § 2113(a) covers "intimidation" and extortion; "intimidation" can be satisfied without a threatened use of physical force (e.g., indirect threats), so it may not categorically require force | "Intimidation" necessarily entails threatened use of physical force; implicit threats (demand notes, proximity) suffice to put a reasonable person in fear of bodily harm | Yes — § 2113(a) (bank robbery by intimidation/force) categorically involves use or threatened use of physical force and is a violent felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach requires comparing statutory elements to generic offense)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (definition of "generic burglary")
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (limits on state statutes that sweep broader than generic burglary)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (elements-clause analysis; burglary/robbery force threshold)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (interpretation of "force" in related statutes)
- United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.) (robbery threats can include indirect or unspecified means; rejects overly narrow view of "force")
- United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir.) (intimidation involves threatened use of physical force)
- United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.) (intimidation causes reasonable fear of bodily harm and thus meets force element)