United States v. Eural Black, 24-1191

Background

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, restricting the "stacking" of sentences for consecutive § 924(c) firearm convictions and making the change nonretroactive.
In 2024, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended its policy to allow consideration of certain nonretroactive legal changes as a basis for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Eural Black, serving a 40-year sentence due mostly to stacked § 924(c) convictions, sought a sentence reduction, arguing that the new policy and amendment provide an extraordinary and compelling reason.
The district court denied Black’s motion, citing Seventh Circuit precedent (Thacker) that the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment cannot serve as a reason for compassionate release.
Black appealed, framing a conflict between the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy and the circuit's precedent on what counts as "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for relief.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that its own precedent controls where it views the Commission to have exceeded its statutory authority by making the anti-stacking amendment retroactive in effect.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment to § 924(c) can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)	Black: The Sentencing Commission’s amended policy permits considering nonretroactive sentence disparities as extraordinary reasons for release.	Government: Thacker precedents control; making the anti-stacking amendment a release basis contradicts Congress’s bar on retroactivity.	The amendment cannot be used as an extraordinary and compelling reason; precedent (Thacker) prevails over the Commission’s conflicting policy.
Whether the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.13(b)(6) lawfully supersedes prior circuit precedent	Black: Commission has explicit statutory authority to interpret “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”	Government: Commission’s policy is invalid where it conflicts with the First Step Act’s explicit nonretroactivity for anti-stacking.	Commission exceeded its authority; court precedent remains binding.
Whether district courts retain discretion to grant reduced sentences based on stacking disparities after Commission guidance	Black: District court can weigh individual circumstances and nonretroactive legal changes as part of compassionate release review.	Government: Any use of the stacking amendment (even as one factor) violates the express statutory scheme.	Not permissible; any reduction based on the amendment impermissibly grants retroactivity.
Applicability of Thacker after Commission’s new policy	Black: Thacker was a temporary, gap-filling rule until Commission issued updated policy.	Government: Thacker interpreted the statute itself, not just a policy gap; controls even after new Commission guidance.	Thacker remains binding; Commission’s policy cannot override it where it conflicts with federal statute.

Key Cases Cited

Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (Supreme Court emphasized limits on agencies giving meaning to sentencing statutes)
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (Supreme Court upheld Sentencing Commission’s structure and role)
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (Clarified sentencing under § 924(c))
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) (Seventh Circuit precedent that the anti-stacking amendment cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release)
United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (addressed the impact of the Sentencing Commission lacking a quorum on compassionate release motions)
United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021) (Similar holding as Thacker, denying retroactive effect of First Step Act for compassionate release)