United States v. Eural Black, 24-1191

Background

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, limiting mandatory consecutive sentencing (“stacking”) for multiple § 924(c) convictions, but made this change nonretroactive.
Eural Black was convicted and sentenced before the First Step Act to 40 years, including 30 years for stacked § 924(c) convictions, resulting in what would now be considered an "unusually long sentence."
In 2024, the United States Sentencing Commission amended its policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)) to allow consideration of sentence reductions for inmates serving unusually long sentences due to subsequent changes in law.
Black sought a sentence reduction based on the First Step Act’s anti-stacking provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing it constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release.
The district court denied Black’s motion, citing controlling precedent (United States v. Thacker, 7th Cir.), which held the First Step Act's nonretroactive amendment could not support compassionate release.
On appeal, the main dispute is whether the Sentencing Commission’s new policy statement or the circuit's prior interpretation governs eligibility for relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)?	Black argued the amendment creates a gross disparity and, per the new guideline, can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.	U.S. argued precedent (Thacker) holds the amendment cannot serve as such a reason, as Congress barred retroactivity.	The amendment cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason, even when considered alongside other factors.
Whether the Sentencing Commission’s U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) policy statement supersedes the circuit’s precedent.	Black: The updated policy statement now controls as Congress delegated interpretive authority to the Commission.	U.S.: The guideline cannot override a contrary statute or circuit precedent when it exceeds statutory authority.	The Commission’s guideline is invalid to the extent it conflicts with federal law and circuit precedent controls.
Does denying relief under these circumstances violate the First Step Act’s intent or statutory limits?	Black: Denial frustrates First Step Act’s goal of remedying unjustly long sentences.	U.S.: Congress explicitly made the amendment nonretroactive and only prospective relief is allowed.	No violation; the law’s nonretroactivity must be respected.
Is Thacker a permanent interpretation or only until Commission acted?	Black: Thacker was intended as a gap-filler pending new policy statements.	U.S.: Thacker construed the statute, not just a policy gap, and remains binding unless overruled.	Thacker remains binding authority regardless of updated Commission guidance.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) (held First Step Act’s § 924(c) amendment is not extraordinary and compelling under § 3582)
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (explained the role and limits of the Sentencing Commission)
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upheld the Sentencing Commission’s constitutional authority)
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) (explained pre-First Step Act stacking penalties under § 924(c))
United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (pre-guideline policy statements did not apply to prisoner-initiated compassionate release motions)