131 F.4th 542
7th Cir.2025Background
- In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which limited the “stacking” of consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), but applied the limitation only prospectively (not retroactively).
- The Sentencing Commission later revised its policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)) to permit courts to consider sentence reductions for incarcerated persons serving unusually long sentences due to changes in law, such as the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment.
- Eural Black is serving a 40-year sentence, including 30 years from stacked § 924(c) convictions, and argued for a reduced sentence based on the First Step Act change and the revised policy statement.
- The district court denied Black’s motion for compassionate release, citing the Seventh Circuit’s prior decision in United States v. Thacker, which held the First Step Act’s limitation on stacking cannot be used as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for sentence reduction since Congress made the change non-retroactive.
- Black appealed, arguing that the Sentencing Commission’s new policy should control, while the government argued that the Thacker precedent remains binding.
Issues
| Issue | Black’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the revised guideline § 1B1.13(b)(6) allows relief for stacked § 924(c) sentences | The guideline allows courts to consider changes in law (like § 924(c) stacking) as extraordinary and compelling; thus, Black is eligible | Thacker remains binding and the guideline cannot override precedent or make a non-retroactive statute retroactive | Seventh Circuit precedent (Thacker) controls; guideline cannot override Congress’s intent re: non-retroactivity |
| Whether the Commission exceeded statutory authority with § 1B1.13(b)(6) | Commission is within delegated authority to interpret 'extraordinary and compelling' reasons | Policy conflicts with congressional limit in the First Step Act by making a non-retroactive change retroactive | Commission exceeded authority; its policy cannot override the statute’s non-retroactivity |
| Whether Thacker was only a gap-filler until Commission acted | Commission’s current policy should supersede interim judicial construction | Thacker is an interpretation of statute itself, not just a gap-filler, and remains binding | Thacker was not just an interim fix; court’s statutory interpretation controls |
| The impact of circuit split and Commission’s attempt to resolve with compromise policy | Policy reflects reasonable compromise and circuit split; courts should defer | Conflicting with federal statute is not permitted, regardless of policy’s reasonableness | Courts must enforce statute’s prospective-only application per Thacker |
Key Cases Cited
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (upholding creation and powers of Sentencing Commission)
- Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (limits of agency authority; agency policy must conform to congressional statutes)
- United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (describing prior § 924(c) stacking regime)
- United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) (First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment not extraordinary/compelling reason for sentence reduction)
- United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (policy statements’ applicability to BOP and prisoner motions)