55 F.4th 846
11th Cir.2022Background
- Eugene Jackson pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and was sentenced under ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) to the 15‑year mandatory minimum.
- The PSR counted at least three qualifying "previous convictions": two violent‑felony convictions and two Florida cocaine convictions (Fla. Stat. § 893.13) from 1998 and 2004.
- The federal Controlled Substances schedule included ioflupane in 1998 and 2004 but the federal government removed ioflupane from Schedule II in 2015.
- Jackson argued his Florida convictions no longer qualify as ACCA "serious drug offenses" because, at the time of his 2017 firearm offense, ioflupane was no longer a federally controlled substance.
- The district court rejected Jackson’s objection and applied ACCA; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying a backward‑looking rule that looks to the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jackson) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which version of the federal Controlled Substances schedules governs ACCA’s "serious drug offense" definition for prior state convictions — the schedule in effect at the time of the prior conviction or at the time of the later federal firearm offense? | ACCA should use the schedule in effect at the time of the firearm offense (so ioflupane’s 2015 removal means his prior convictions no longer involve a federally controlled substance). | ACCA looks backward to the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction; prior convictions are assessed under the law as it existed then. | Held: use the schedules in effect at the time of the prior conviction (backward‑looking). Jackson’s 1998 and 2004 convictions remain ACCA predicates. |
| Does applying the historical schedule violate due process or notice? | Retroactive application of an earlier federal schedule denies fair notice. | "Previous convictions" language and McNeill permit backward‑looking assessment; defendants have notice at time of conviction. | Held: due process/fair‑notice concerns rejected; McNeill’s reasoning controls and preserves prior convictions for ACCA purposes. |
Key Cases Cited
- McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) (ACCA’s term "previous convictions" requires a backward‑looking inquiry; penal/elemental questions answered by law at time of prior conviction)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (ACCA "serious drug offense" requires that state offense involve specified drug conduct, not matching a separate generic offense)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (categorical and modified categorical approaches; divisibility analysis)
- United States v. Travis Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) qualifies as an ACCA "serious drug offense" despite lacking mens rea as to substance illicitness)
- United States v. Xavier Smith, 983 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming Travis Smith and Shular on mens rea and categorical approach)
- United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) (de novo review of whether prior state conviction qualifies under ACCA; categorical approach)