United States v. Estes
5:09-cr-50088
W.D. Ark.Sep 26, 2012Background
- Estes moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after a 2010 conviction for child pornography offenses (Counts 1–6) and related Count 7 in the Western District of Arkansas.
- Jury trial occurred December 9–10, 2009; Estes challenged jury instructions, notably Element 2 (use of interstate/foreign commerce) and the court’s handling of the jury’s questions.
- The Court instructed four elements for Counts 1–6 and for Count 7, including specific physical evidence and interstate/foreign commerce involvement; the internet was characterized as a facility of interstate commerce.
- The jury convicted Estes on all counts on December 10, 2009; a PSR and victim-impact statements were later considered at sentencing.
- Estes received concurrent terms: 262 months (Counts 1–6), 240 months (Count 7), life supervised release, $20,000 fine, and $700 special assessment; he appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule on ground three about jury instruction response | Estes contends the court’s response improperly highlighted Element 2. | Estes’ counsel argued the response called unnecessary attention to Element 2. | Procedural default; no abuse of discretion or reversible error shown. |
| Whether attaching victim impact statements to the PSR was improper | Estes argues attachment was improper and prejudicial. | Government contends no reversible error. | Grounds One and Two rejected; §2255 relief not available for these on collateral review. |
| Whether the jury’s question during deliberations tainted verdict | Estes asserts improper guidance affected due process. | Court properly redirected; instruction compliant with case law. | No reversible error; not a basis for §2255 relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (limitations on §2255 for relitigation on direct appeal)
- United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2001) (procedural default rules for collateral review)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (actual innocence exception to procedural default)
- Swedzinski v. United States, 160 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 1998) (defaulted claims require cause and prejudice or actual innocence)
- United States v. Planas, 884 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Kan. 1995) (counsel's ineffective advice to appeal not per se cause)
- United States v. Abdul–Aziz, 486 F.3d 471 (8th Cir. 2007) (courts may refer jury to original instructions in response to questions)
- Monteer v. Benson, 574 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1978) (improper jury instructions generally not cognizable in §2255)
- Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978) (collateral relief not substitute for direct appeal)
- Jackson v. United States, 495 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1974) (limitations on using §2255 for trial errors)
- Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (standard for fundamental defects in jury instructions)
- Merrill v. United States, 599 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (reaffirmed limits on collateral relief for jury instruction errors)
