United States v. Estelle Stein
881 F.3d 853
11th Cir.2018Background
- Government sued Estelle Stein seeking judgment on IRS assessments for tax years 1996, 1999–2002, claiming ~ $220,000 plus additions; district court entered summary judgment for government.
- Government submitted returns, IRS account transcripts, and an IRS officer affidavit establishing assessments and the presumption of correctness.
- Stein filed a self-authored affidavit claiming, from personal recollection, that she paid the taxes and penalties for the years at issue but lacked documentary bank records; she noted an IRS misapplication of a 1996 payment.
- The district court found Stein’s affidavit insufficient to rebut the assessment presumption because it was self-serving and uncorroborated, granting summary judgment to the government.
- A prior Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed relying on Mays v. United States; the en banc court vacated, reviewed whether Mays’ rule barring uncorroborated/self‑serving affidavits at summary judgment should be overruled, and remanded for further consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a self‑serving, uncorroborated affidavit can create a genuine dispute to defeat summary judgment | Stein: Her non‑conclusory sworn affidavit, based on personal knowledge, creates a triable issue that she paid the assessments | Government: Taxpayer must provide corroboration/documentary proof to overcome the presumption of correctness attached to IRS assessments | Court: Overrules Mays to hold Rule 56 does not bar self‑serving or uncorroborated affidavits from creating genuine factual disputes; such affidavits can preclude summary judgment if otherwise admissible |
| Whether Rule 56 requires corroboration beyond Rule 56(c)’s personal‑knowledge/admissibility/competence requirements | Stein: No separate corroboration requirement in Rule 56 | Government: Substantive tax law and the presumption of correctness justify requiring corroboration | Court: Rule 56 contains no corroboration gloss; any corroboration requirement must come from substantive law or evidentiary rules, not Rule 56 |
| Whether tax cases use a different summary judgment standard | Stein: Summary judgment standard is the same across civil cases | Government: Tax context and presumption of assessment correctness warrant different treatment | Court: Applies ordinary summary judgment standard in tax cases; same Rule 56 principles apply |
| Effect of prior case law (Mays/Gibson) on summary judgment posture | Stein: Mays improperly precluded reliance on self‑serving affidavits at summary judgment | Government: Mays and related precedents support requiring more than uncorroborated statements | Court: Mays is overruled to the extent it barred such affidavits at summary judgment; Gibson concerned deference after trial, not summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fior D’Italia, 536 U.S. 238 (2002) (assessment entitled to presumption of correctness)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (Rule 56 summary judgment burden allocation)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (court may not weigh evidence or assess credibility at summary judgment)
- Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1985) (overruled insofar as it barred self‑serving/uncorroborated affidavits from creating genuine issues at summary judgment)
- Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (affidavits cannot be merely conclusory)