United States v. Eric Johnson, 734 F.3d 270

Police in a high-crime Baltimore neighborhood stopped Eric Johnson’s vehicle after observing a bent, allegedly illegible temporary registration tag. Officers smelled marijuana and obtained Johnson’s consent to search the car; two small bags of marijuana were produced from his mouth.
Johnson was handcuffed and transported in an officers’ unmarked car to the police station; he was not Mirandized before or during the initial transport.
While en route, Johnson voluntarily offered to “help” and said he could “get you a gun.” An officer asked “what do you mean?,” then gave Miranda warnings; at the station Johnson signed a waiver and consented to a search of his home.
Officers recovered a firearm in Johnson’s bedroom closet. Johnson was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession). He moved to suppress the statements and the firearm; the district court denied the motions.
Johnson preserved the suppression issues in a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression and Johnson’s conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Lawfulness of the traffic stop (Fourth Amendment)	Stop was unlawful because tag was not actually bent; officers used tag as pretext and failed to act on it after stopping	Tag was bent and illegible; observation of illegible tag objectively justified the stop regardless of officers’ subjective motive	Stop was reasonable: district court’s factual finding that tag was bent not clearly erroneous; observing a traffic violation supplies objective justification for the stop (affirmed)
Whether officer’s question “what do you mean?” was a custodial interrogation (Fifth Amendment / Miranda)	The question, posed while Johnson was in custody and before Miranda warnings, was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses and thus violated Miranda	Johnson’s initial statement was voluntary and offered to benefit himself; the officer’s simple clarifying question was not reasonably likely to elicit self-incriminating statements under Innis	Not an interrogation under Miranda: the question was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response; subsequent Miranda warnings made later statements admissible (affirmed)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes Miranda warnings and custodial-interrogation rule)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (Miranda applies to police conduct that is the functional equivalent of interrogation — reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (objective reasonableness of traffic stops; subjective motive irrelevant)
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2008) (observing a traffic violation provides sufficient justification to detain vehicle)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (questioned practice of delaying Miranda warnings until after interrogation produces confession)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (suppression remedy’s deterrent purpose must outweigh harm to justice system)
United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (suggests courts may consider officers’ ignoring the predicate violation when evaluating reasonableness)