United States v. Eric Christian
749 F.3d 806
9th Cir.2014Background
- In 2009 Eric Christian sent emails to two North Las Vegas officials containing explicit threats; he was charged with two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for interstate transmission of threats and convicted after a two-day jury trial.
- Christian sought to present a diminished-capacity defense (lack of specific intent to threaten); his chosen expert, Dr. Charles Colosimo, had earlier performed a competency-to-stand-trial evaluation and diagnosed psychosis and other disorders.
- The district court excluded Dr. Colosimo’s testimony on the ground that his competency examination was not the same as a diminished-capacity evaluation and denied a diminished-capacity jury instruction because no expert linked Christian’s mental illness to his ability to form intent.
- On appeal Christian argued the exclusion was an abuse of discretion and that a diminished-capacity instruction was warranted even without expert testimony; the government defended the exclusion as proper and contended the record lacked sufficient proffer.
- The Ninth Circuit held the exclusion was an abuse of discretion because the court focused improperly on the legal label (competency versus diminished capacity) instead of whether the evaluation’s observations/diagnoses could help the jury assess specific intent; the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the diminished-capacity instruction on the original record (absent expert testimony linking illness to intent) but instructed that such an instruction must be given if relevant evidence is introduced at retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony (Dr. Colosimo) | District court erred by excluding an expert who examined Christian for competency; the evaluation’s observations and diagnoses were relevant to diminished capacity and the court should have allowed voir dire. | Testimony was irrelevant because the exam addressed competency (different legal standard) not diminished capacity; proffer insufficient. | Abuse of discretion to exclude without voir dire; expert could have offered relevant factual/diagnostic testimony (Rule 702) though not the ultimate legal conclusion; exclusion prejudiced defendant — vacated and remanded. |
| Jury instruction on diminished capacity | A jury instruction was warranted because Christian’s erratic, disturbed behavior provided a foundation for diminished capacity. | No sufficient evidentiary link on the record between mental illness and inability to form specific intent; absent expert linking illness to mens rea, instruction not required. | No abuse of discretion denying instruction on this record; but if admissible evidence (e.g., expert testimony) at retrial links illness to intent, court must give the instruction. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (admissibility inquiry should consider test results and whether expert’s observations help jury on fact in issue)
- Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 2014) (erroneous admission or exclusion of prejudicial expert evidence requiring new trial when record too sparse to resolve admissibility)
- United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988) (diminished capacity focuses on ability to attain culpable mental state)
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (competency standard: ability to consult with counsel and understand proceedings)
- United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (expert may testify about predicate mental-state matters so long as they do not state ultimate mens rea conclusion)
- United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rule 704(b) prohibits experts from stating ultimate legal conclusion about defendant’s mens rea)
- United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant entitled to instruction on any defense with some foundation in the evidence)
- United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1999) (exclusion of evidence can be reversible when it prevents defendant from presenting an evidentiary basis for defense)