United States v. Eric Andrews, 12f4th255

In 2005 Eric Andrews (then 19) committed a series of 13 armed robberies; a jury convicted him of robbery, conspiracy, and multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
In 2006 Andrews was sentenced to 312 years (57 months on robbery/conspiracy counts and consecutive § 924(c) terms driven by then-applicable 25-year mandatory minima for second-or-subsequent § 924(c) convictions).
The First Step Act (2018) reduced § 924(c) penalties for subsequent offenses but made that change nonretroactive; it also authorized prisoner-initiated compassionate-release motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Andrews moved for compassionate release citing (a) the sentence length, (b) nonretroactive statutory change, (c) rehabilitation, (d) his young age at offense, (e) being charged with thirteen § 924(c) counts, and (f) COVID-19 vulnerability.
The District Court held the Sentencing Commission policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13) was not binding on prisoner-initiated motions but could guide interpretation; it ruled that sentence length and statutory nonretroactivity cannot be "extraordinary and compelling" as a matter of law and denied relief because Andrews’s remaining arguments (age, rehabilitation, charging decisions, COVID risk) collectively were insufficient.
The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding the policy statement is not binding on prisoner motions, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is binding for prisoner-initiated § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions	§1B1.13 defines "extraordinary and compelling" and should bind courts	§1B1.13 applies only to motions by the BOP Director and thus is inapplicable to prisoner motions	Not binding; policy statement applies to BOP-initiated motions but may be used as guidance
Whether the length of a lawfully imposed sentence is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason	Andrews: extremely long term (312 years) is extraordinary	Government: a lawful, statutorily authorized sentence is not "extraordinary"	Not extraordinary as a matter of law
Whether nonretroactive changes to § 924(c) create "extraordinary and compelling" reasons	Andrews: First Step Act changes make current sentence unjust	Government: Congress expressly made changes nonretroactive; ordinary nonretroactivity cannot be extraordinary	Nonretroactivity cannot, by itself, qualify as extraordinary and compelling
Whether Andrews’s age at offense, rehabilitation, prosecutorial charging, and COVID risk suffice	Andrews: combined factors (young age, rehab, charging disparity, COVID susceptibility) warrant release	Government: insufficient proof of prosecutorial abuse; COVID risk not shown; age/rehab alone not compelling enough	District Court did not abuse discretion; reasons collectively insufficient

United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (policy statement not binding on prisoner-initiated motions; guidance only)
United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (same conclusion on §1B1.13)
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) (length of a lawful sentence is not "extraordinary and compelling")
United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021) (nonretroactive statutory changes do not alone create extraordinary and compelling reasons)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (ordinary practice is to apply new penalties prospectively)
United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020) (compassionate-release denials reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc., 787 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2015) (use of dictionary definitions to ascertain ordinary meaning in statutory interpretation)
United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act § 403 nonretroactivity as applied in this circuit)