United States v. Epstein
91 F. Supp. 3d 573
D.N.J.2015Background
- Four Orthodox Jewish men (Mendel Epstein, Jay Goldstein, David Epstein, Binyamin Stimler) indicted for conspiracy to commit kidnapping and several substantive kidnapping/attempted-kidnapping counts arising from alleged use of force to obtain religious divorce documents (gets).
- Indictment alleges some incidents involved tying, beating, and transporting recalcitrant husbands; several arrests followed an FBI sting in which undercover agents posed as an agunah and her brother.
- Defendants asserted Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) defenses: (1) prosecution substantially burdens their religious exercise (assisting agunot and, they say, Jewish law permits certain force to obtain gets), and (2) RFRA required dismissal or severance (Stimler).
- Defendants also sought to introduce evidence of their religious beliefs to negate specific intent and to argue that husbands’ prior assent (ketubah or halakhic commitments) amounted to consent to the acts.
- The district court held RFRA did not excuse prosecution for violent crimes, declined to dismiss or sever, and excluded religious-law evidence to negate intent or supply a prospective consent defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RFRA bars prosecution/dismissal of indictment | RFRA prevents substantial burden on religious exercise; prosecution of efforts to free agunot impermissibly burdens defendants' mitzvah | Prosecution is a neutral, generally applicable enforcement of violent-crime laws; government has compelling interest and least restrictive means | RFRA does not bar prosecution; no substantial burden shown and, even if, the government has a compelling interest in uniformly preventing violent crimes and enforcement is least restrictive means |
| Whether Stimler must be severed under RFRA | His role as a get witness (no money, no violence, no knowledge) means RFRA compels severance/dismissal | RFRA is not a vehicle to resolve evidentiary sufficiency; severance is not required because burdens alleged are not religious | Denied: court will not adjudicate evidence sufficiency on RFRA motion or sever for this reason |
| Whether sting/investigative tactics violated RFRA | The sting and prosecution deter religious exercise and therefore must be justified under RFRA | Investigatory tactics to detect violent conspiracies serve a compelling interest; sting did not substantially burden religion | Denied: sting operation was lawful investigatory means and did not violate RFRA |
| Whether defendants may introduce religious-law evidence to negate specific intent or to show prospective consent via ketubah | Religious beliefs and halakhic commitments negate mens rea and show victims consented prospectively | Motive/religious justification does not negate the specific intent elements; prospective or religiously based consent is not valid under federal kidnapping law and would confuse the jury | Denied: religious motivation is motive, not mens rea; ketubah-based prospective consent is insufficient and would be unduly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA requires government show compelling interest and least restrictive means; exemptions may be disallowed where uniformity is necessary)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (RFRA’s demanding, focused inquiry and least-restrictive-means requirement)
- Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015) (RFRA/substantial-burden legal standard discussion)
- In re Grand Jury Empaneling of Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826 (3d Cir. 1999) (government’s compelling interest in investigating serious crime)
- Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946) (religious belief cannot absolve liability for federal kidnapping)
- United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (uniform enforcement of certain laws may be a compelling interest)