United States v. Enrique Acosta-Sierra
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17070
| 9th Cir. | 2012Background
- Acosta-Sierra, a 57-year-old Mexican national with paranoid schizophrenia, entered the U.S. from Mexico and threw a jagged rock toward CBP Officer Lopez, missing him but creating fear after the fact; Lopez did not see the rock or fear imminent harm at the moment of the throw.
- Lopez learned of the rock after it hit a gate and landed near him; he subsequently perceived a threat when Acosta-Sierra approached from several car lengths away.
- Acosta-Sierra was later charged with Count 2 (assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b)) partially based on using a dangerous weapon (rocks); Count 1 (illegal reentry) was dismissed.
- A subsequent incident while awaiting trial involved Acosta-Sierra punching Officer Burrola in a holding cell; this led to Count 3 (assault on a federal officer under § 111(a)(1)).
- The district court denied in limine evidence of diminished capacity and self-defense theories, and the bench trial resulted in convictions on Counts 2 and 3.
- On appeal, Acosta-Sierra challenges (1) the Rule 23(c) findings and sufficiency of the Count 2 evidence, (2) Rule 29 denial, (3) the absence of a diminished-capacity defense under § 111, and (4) exclusion of mental-health evidence for a self-defense theory; the Ninth Circuit reverses in part, affirms in part, and remands for retrial consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is there sufficient intent under § 111 for Count 2 if the rock-throwing is considered not merely a display of force but an attempted battery? | Acosta-Sierra argues the district court erred by applying a wrong standard to § 111’s intent. | Acosta-Sierra contends the government did not prove intentional use of force under the proper standard. | Count 2 overturned for incorrect legal standard; retrial permitted under proper attempted-battery standard. |
| Does § 111 require specific or general intent for assault on a federal officer? | Government previously relied on general-intent view per Jim and Chapman. | Acosta-Sierra argues Chapman undermines Jim’s analysis on mens rea. | Court holds § 111 is a general-intent crime; diminished-capacity defense mistakenly precluded but affirmed for self-defense issues on Count 3; remand for retrial on Count 2 under proper standard. |
| Was the district court correct to preclude diminished-capacity evidence for Count 3? | Acosta-Sierra sought diminished-capacity defense based on paranoia/schizophrenia. | Jim supports a general-intent view, limiting diminished-capacity applicability. | Diminished-capacity defense is not applicable under § 111; evidence properly precluded. |
| Did the court improperly exclude mental-health evidence for a self-defense claim on Count 3? | Mental-health evidence could support a reasonable-belief self-defense theory. | Self-defense requires objective reasonableness; attacker cannot rely on mental-health evidence to justify assault. | Court affirms exclusion of mental-health evidence for self-defense; narrow self-defense doctrine acknowledged but not applicable here. |
| Is retrial barred by Double Jeopardy after reversal on Count 2? | Retrial should be barred if evidence is insufficient under proper standard. | Retrial permissible if evidence could convict under proper standard. | Double Jeopardy does not bar retrial; remand for retrial consistent with proper standard on Count 2. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chapman, 529 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) (defines assault under § 111 using common-law concepts; clarifies intent requirements)
- United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (Supreme Court 1975) (Congress intended to protect federal officers and functions in § 111)
- United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989) (discusses general vs. specific intent for § 111 in light of Feola; supports general-intent view)
- United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1969) (holds mens rea as essential element in forcible assault under § 111)
- United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1982) (fear of the victim not always required for § 111; distinguishes from § 113 context)
- United States v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2007) (an attempted battery theory; dictates applicability regardless of victim’s fear)