United States v. Enil Montoya Velasquez, 52 F.4th 133

Federal grand jury indicted Enil Ramon Montoya Velasquez on five drug counts on August 28, 2018; arraignment occurred July 22, 2019 after multiple postponements.
At arraignment Velasquez pleaded guilty to three counts and not guilty to Counts One and Four; the district court’s minute order stated "trial to be set by order at a later date – speedy trial computation excluded by the court" but gave no contemporaneous reasons or duration for the exclusion.
Case manager communications followed; court issued a November 7, 2019 order scheduling trial for February 25, 2020 and expressly excluded the delay under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
Velasquez later moved to dismiss Counts One and Four under the Speedy Trial Act, arguing (1) the 108-day period from July 22–Nov 7, 2019 and (2) the 110-day period from Nov 7–Feb 25, 2020 were not excludable.
District court denied the motion; a jury convicted Velasquez on Counts One and Four and he was sentenced. He appealed, challenging the procedural sufficiency of the ends-of-justice continuance and arguing estoppel did not bar review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Velasquez)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether the July 22, 2019 continuance satisfied § 3161(h)(7) procedural requirements	Record lacks an on-the-record, contemporaneous balancing; minute order is conclusory and no party requested an ends-of-justice continuance at arraignment	Court can infer the continuance was for defense trial preparation (citing prior counsel health delays and parties’ statements about calendar)	Reversed: district court erred procedurally; July 22–Nov 7 (108 days) may not be excluded. Counts One and Four must be dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act.
Whether Velasquez is estopped from raising the Speedy Trial claim	Not estopped: he did not expressly consent to or persuade the court to make an ends-of-justice finding at arraignment	Keith-based estoppel: counsel’s assent to scheduling made at arraignment bars later challenge	Not estopped: Keith’s single-factor estoppel is inconsistent with Zedner; applying Zedner factors, court held Velasquez did not persuade the court and did not take a clearly inconsistent position, so estoppel is inappropriate.

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (ends-of-justice continuance requires on-the-record findings made before granting; findings must appear by time of ruling on dismissal).
United States v. Henry, 538 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (record must show contemporaneous balancing for § 3161(h)(7) exclusion).
United States v. Keith, 42 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1994) (estoppel when defendant agreed to reasons supporting an ends-of-justice finding).
Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (dismissal may be with or without prejudice; court may consider who caused the delay).
United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2017) (sentencing package doctrine: vacatur of convictions may void entire sentence).
United States v. Mosteller, 741 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2014) (Speedy Trial Act dismissal is mandatory when unexcludable time exceeds statutory limit).