779 F.3d 1161
10th Cir.2015Background
- Engles, a registered sex offender, was on federal supervised release with a condition prohibiting commission of any federal, state, or local crime.
- On Sept. 5, 2013, Engles accompanied his girlfriend to her 16-year-old daughter’s high school to update emergency contact information and spent ~10 minutes on campus.
- A school employee recognized Engles as a sex offender and reported him; Oklahoma charged him under the Zone of Safety Around Schools statute for “loitering.”
- A state jury convicted Engles; sentence was time served plus a $2,500 fine; his state appeal is pending.
- The federal district court revoked Engles’s supervised release based on the state conviction and imposed 13 months’ imprisonment and 24 months’ supervised release.
- On federal appeal Engles argued only that his conduct did not constitute loitering (i.e., a collateral attack on the state conviction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Engles may collaterally attack the Oklahoma conviction in his federal supervised-release appeal | N/A (government relied on state conviction to revoke) | Engles contends his conduct did not constitute loitering and thus the conviction is invalid | Court held Engles cannot collaterally attack the state conviction in the supervised-release appeal; revocation affirmed |
| Whether district court should have reconsidered underlying facts instead of relying on the conviction | N/A | Engles suggested the factual dispute about loitering warranted review | Court explained revocation was based on a stand-alone state conviction, not the district court’s independent factual finding, so challenge must be to the conviction itself |
| Applicability of precedents allowing reversal where revocation rests on court’s legal/factual errors | N/A | Engles relied on cases reversing revocations where district court erred on law/facts | Court distinguished those cases (Disney, Reber) because those involved direct assessment of conduct by the revoking court, not reliance on an independent conviction |
| Whether a successful state appeal could permit relief from the federal revocation | N/A | Engles noted state appeal pending and argued for consideration | Court dismissed collateral attack without prejudice and stated a successful state appeal could support a future motion to vacate the revocation |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due-process principles applicable to revocation proceedings)
- United States v. Reber, 876 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (revocation review where district court’s factual/legal errors were controlling)
- United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (revocation reversed where court misinterpreted federal criminal statute at issue)
- United States v. Garza, 484 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1973) (probationer may not relitigate issues determined in other forums when revocation is based on a conviction)
- United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant may not collaterally attack the conviction that formed basis for probation revocation)
