United States v. Encarnacion, 26 F.4th 490

Background

DEA obtained a Title III wiretap targeting Robin Martinez Suazo after prior investigations suggested he was a long‑term wholesale drug trafficker in the Boston area. The application aggregated multiple informant reports, surveillance, and phone/pen‑register data.
Intercepts captured several Spanish‑language calls between Suazo and Droel Encarnacion discussing prices, quantities, and logistics (e.g., buying in Utah and reselling in Boston).
Encarnacion flew from Salt Lake City to Boston, retrieved a FedEx package addressed from him to an address tied to Suazo; the package contained 427.3 grams of cocaine. Encarnacion and Suazo were arrested and indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
Encarnacion moved to suppress the wiretap fruits (arguing staleness and lack of necessity), then raised four appellate claims after conviction: (1) improper wiretap authorization, (2) erroneous juror strike for cause, (3) improper admission of DEA supervisor expert testimony, and (4) improper admission of four intercepted calls as prior‑acts evidence.
The district court denied suppression, admitted the contested evidence and expert testimony (with conditions), empaneled a jury after excusing a veniremember for cause, and the jury convicted; the First Circuit affirmed on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of wiretap (probable cause / staleness)	Gov't: aggregated informant reports, recent surveillance and phone activity supported timely probable cause to target Suazo and intercept communications.	Encarnacion: affidavit contained stale or unreliable information insufficient to establish probable cause.	Affirmed — totality showed ongoing drug trafficking; facts were timely and more than minimally adequate.
Wiretap necessity	Gov't: traditional techniques (surveillance, informants, records) had been tried or were inadequate; wiretap was needed to identify suppliers, network, methods.	Encarnacion: less intrusive means (e.g., executing warrants after May 1 transaction) could have sufficed; goals overly broad.	Affirmed — necessity met under a practical, context‑specific standard for sprawling drug investigations; government need not exhaust every alternative.
Juror struck for cause (pro‑"defunding the police" comment)	Gov't/court: juror expressed reservations about ability to be fair when asked directly; strike for cause appropriate to ensure impartiality.	Encarnacion: statement reflected principled skepticism, not inability to be fair; court should have probed further.	Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; juror voiced reservations about fairness and was properly excused.
Expert testimony (DEA supervisor interpreting coded language)	Gov't: Agent Tully’s experience and foundation made his testimony admissible to explain jargon and transactional context; cross‑examination and jury instructions guarded prejudice.	Encarnacion: methodology was self‑validating/unreliable and jargon was plain enough for jurors without expert help.	Affirmed — defendant failed to contemporaneously object (plain‑error review); methodology and use of expert were permissible and not plain error.
Admission of earlier intercepted calls (Rule 404(b)/403)	Gov't: calls were intrinsic or at least specially relevant to show background, development, and the working relationship leading to the charged conspiracy.	Encarnacion: calls were prior acts outside the indictment period involving different drugs and risked unfair propensity inference.	Affirmed — district court reasonably found special relevance (intrinsic/developmental); probative value outweighed prejudice under Rule 403.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gordon, 871 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2017) (wiretap standards and minimal adequacy review)
United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (wiretap necessity and related requirements)
United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562 (1st Cir. 1996) (staleness in probable‑cause analysis for warrants)
United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988) (drug conspiracies’ long shelf‑life for probable cause)
United States v. Santana‑Dones, 920 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2019) (wiretap necessity in drug investigations)
United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1987) (use of expert testimony to interpret drug codes)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (expert‑testimony reliability analysis under Rule 702)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (flexible, context‑specific reliability inquiry for experts)
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (juror impartiality and voir dire principles)
United States v. Green, 698 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (admitting other‑acts evidence to explain formation/development of conspiracy)
United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (upholding expert testimony explaining drug‑trade jargon)
United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013) (appellate deference to district court balancing under Rule 403)