United States v. Emmett Spencer
405 U.S. App. D.C. 359
| D.C. Cir. | 2013Background
- Spencer pled guilty in 2006 to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon; sentenced to 37 months and 3 years supervised release.
- While on supervised release, he violated and had his release revoked, receiving 14 months imprisonment and 22 months supervised release.
- After release, he violated again; his second revocation resulted in 24 months imprisonment with no further supervised release.
- The district court sentenced him to 24 months imprisonment after the second revocation.
- Since the 2003 PROTECT Act amendment, courts no longer aggregate revocation sentences across revocations for the two-year class-C cap; instead, per-revocation limits apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3583(e)(3) aggregates revocation sentences. | Spencer argues aggregate cap applies (2 years). | Spencer argues the all-or-part clause permits aggregation. | Aggregation not required; per-revocation limits apply. |
| Whether the all-or-part clause limits to 3 years or permits per-revocation limits post-PROTECT Act. | Spencer contends total cap is 22 months after first 14 months. | Court may impose per-revocation limits up to 2-year class-C cap per revocation. | 2003 amendment makes per-revocation limits; no aggregate cap. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011) (holds PROTECT Act’s ‘on any such revocation’ caps per revocation)
- United States v. Hunt, 673 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejects aggregation of prior revocation sentences)
- United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2012) (per-revocation limits; aggregation not required)
- United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010) (interprets PROTECT Act limits as per-revocation)
- United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (per-revocation limits under PROTECT Act)
- United States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2008) (per-revocation limits under PROTECT Act)
- United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2004) (early interpretation of per-revocation limits)
