United States v. Elizabeth Lopez, 880 F.3d 974

Lopez was arrested in Sioux City, IA after an informant (Navrkal) identified her as his methamphetamine source; officers found 26.1 grams of 100% pure methamphetamine on her person.
Government charged Lopez with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; trial resulted in conviction on both counts.
Key trial evidence: testimony from co-conspirators (Navrkal and Cole–Cabrera) describing multiple deliveries totaling ~1 pound over a year, corroborating text messages, the seized pure methamphetamine, and expert testimony about typical user quantities and effects of purity.
Lopez contested that the quantity and purity supported only personal use, objected to a jury instruction allowing an inference of intent to distribute from purity, and objected to certain DEA-agent testimony as hearsay and Confrontation Clause violations.
District court denied post-trial motions (acquittal/new trial), took judicial notice that Sioux City lies in the Northern District of Iowa, and imposed a 120-month sentence (statutory minimum). The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Lopez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Admissibility of DEA agent testimony	Testimony relied on out-of-court statements (improper hearsay) and prejudiced trial; warrants new trial	Agent testimony was expert opinion under Rule 702; relied on background interviews of users (acceptable) and had minimal influence given other evidence	Court: Admission proper under Rule 702; not hearsay; any error harmless; no new trial
Confrontation Clause	Agent relied on third-party statements without confrontation	Statements were non‑testimonial/general conversation; thus no Crawford problem	Court: Forfeited claim reviewed for plain error; no plain error because statements non‑testimonial
Jury instruction re: purity → intent to distribute	Purity alone insufficient to infer distribution intent; instruction impermissibly broadened law	Instruction permitted inference but limited (may infer if purity suggests cutting/dilution); consistent with precedent	Court: Instruction proper; no abuse of discretion
Venue / judicial notice	Government failed to prove venue; judicial notice of Sioux City in the Northern District improper	Venue proven by evidence of overt acts in Sioux City; judicial notice of territorial boundaries appropriate	Court: Judicial notice appropriate; government met preponderance standard for venue

United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for Rule 33 motions)
United States v. Solorio–Tafolla, 324 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003) (Rule 702 expert testimony admission standard)
Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1997) (experts may rely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay if reasonably relied upon in the field)
United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (plain‑error standard for forfeited Confrontation Clause claims)
United States v. Shurn, 849 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1988) (intent to distribute may be inferred from high purity among other factors)
United States v. Netz, 758 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1985) (venue need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence)
Government of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1979) (venue as a jurisdictional fact may be judicially noticed)