9 F.4th 500
7th Cir.2021Background
- Defendant Elijah Vines trafficked a 15-year-old (GMC) in 2016: transported her, posted ads (Backpage), arranged paid sex acts, and received the proceeds; GMC later disclosed abuse and injuries to medical personnel.
- Vines was convicted after a jury trial on five counts including sex trafficking of a minor, conspiracy, transportation of a minor, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering; sentenced to long prison terms and restitution.
- At trial the government presented FBI SA Hardie as an expert on sex-trafficking victim behavior; Hardie testified generally about victim behavior and said he had not spoken to GMC or read her statements.
- Vines moved to suppress (1) GMC’s identification of Vines from a photo on his Facebook page, (2) evidence from the search of his iPhone (initial seizure and later warrant search), and (3) evidence from searches of his Facebook and iCloud accounts (Challenged the warrant affidavit and sought a Franks hearing).
- The district court denied the in limine motion excluding Hardie’s testimony and denied all suppression motions; Vines appealed those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Vines' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony on sex-trafficking victim behavior | Hardie’s testimony improperly bolstered GMC’s credibility and invaded the jury’s role | Hardie testified only to general victim behavior, had no contact with GMC, and did not opine on credibility | Admission upheld; expert testimony permissible under Rule 702 because it addressed general behavior and did not assess GMC’s credibility |
| Suppression of photo identification from Facebook | Photo presentation was unduly suggestive; police should have used a non-suggestive array given GMC’s credibility issues | Facebook page was identified by GMC herself; detectives did not orchestrate a suggestive police-arranged identification | Denial upheld; no improper police arrangement and identification lacked taint of state-orchestrated suggestion |
| Seizure/search of iPhone | Seizure from girlfriend Smoote invalid because she lacked passcode/possession authority; consent involuntary | Smoote had actual/apparent authority over the phone; seizure followed by a warrant for contents | Denial upheld; third-party consent to seize was valid (analogous to United States v. James) and the subsequent search was pursuant to a warrant |
| Warrant for Facebook/iCloud (Franks claim) | Warrant affidavit contained material misrepresentations/omissions about GMC’s credibility requiring a Franks hearing | Affidavit contained extensive corroboration (Backpage ads, witness statements, hotel registries) so probable cause would exist even correcting alleged errors | Denial upheld; Vines failed to show that alleged falsehoods or omissions would eliminate probable cause, so no Franks hearing required |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1991) (expert testimony cannot tell the jury whom to believe)
- Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012) (due process exclusion applies only to police-arranged suggestive identifications)
- Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555 (2018) (analysis of suggestiveness and reliability in identification cases)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (factors for assessing eyewitness identification reliability)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (standard for challenging warrant affidavits and entitlement to a Franks hearing)
- United States v. James, 571 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (third-party authority allows seizure of property left in another’s possession)
- United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020) (standard of review for expert testimony admission)
- United States v. Bacon, 991 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2021) (probable cause assessed under Gates totality-of-circumstances; Franks standard application)