United States v. Elfred William Petruk
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4692
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- June 2012: Elfred Petruk stole a 1989 GMC pickup truck; Travis Behning later confronted Petruk on the road, was assaulted with a hammer, and identified Petruk; DNA from Petruk matched items in the truck.
- December 2012: While jailed on state charges (no federal indictment yet), Petruk made calls seeking false alibi statements for use in his state proceedings.
- June 2013: Federal indictment returned charging carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and two counts of attempting to obstruct an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2))—Count 2 for the December 2012 conduct, Count 3 for attempts after the federal indictment (late 2013).
- Trial verdict: Jury convicted Petruk on all three counts; district court sentenced him to concurrent 168-month terms.
- Appeal holdings summarized: Court AFFIRMED Count 3 (obstruction after federal charges); REVERSED and VACATED Count 1 (carjacking) and Count 2 (obstruction during state-case period) for insufficient evidence and REMANDED for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Petruk's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 | The truck was unoccupied at initial taking and no force/intent to cause serious harm coincided with a taking; thus elements not met | Carjacking occurred when Petruk assaulted Behning roadside—a second "taking" that coincided with force and intent | Reversed: No second "taking" occurred during assault; initial theft was not from a person or in presence and lacked requisite force/intent for § 2119 |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) requires the defendant to foresee a particular federal proceeding (nexus) | For Count 2, government must show Petruk contemplated a particular, foreseeable federal proceeding | Government argued nexus not required or was satisfied | Held that § 1512(c)(2) incorporates the Aguilar/Arthur Andersen nexus: prosecution must prove defendant contemplated a particular, foreseeable official (federal) proceeding; vacated Count 2 because December 2012 conduct targeted state proceedings |
| Scope of § 1512(c)(2): limited to documents/objects or broader (Counts 2 & 3) | § 1512(c)(2) limited to records/objects (so it wouldn’t cover soliciting false statements) | § 1512(c)(2) is a catch-all "otherwise" clause reaching other obstructive conduct, including soliciting false testimony | Affirmed Count 3: § 1512(c)(2) covers attempts to procure false statements after federal prosecution began |
| Sentencing consequence of vacatur of related conviction | (Implicit) Grouping of counts under Guidelines depended on carjacking conviction | Government relied on grouping with carjacking to set offense level for obstruction counts | Remanded for resentencing because vacatur of carjacking may change Guidelines grouping and range |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506 (standards for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Wright, 246 F.3d 1123 (definition of "taking" as acquisition of possession, dominion, or control)
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (mens rea focuses on the precise moment of taking)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (nexus requirement for catchall obstruction statutes)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (narrowing § 1512 provisions to require contemplation of a particular proceeding)
- United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363 (applying nexus requirement where defendant’s conduct targeted state proceeding)
- United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769 (affirming § 1512(c)(2) conviction for soliciting false statements)
- United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273 (describing § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision)