United States v. Elder, 840 F.3d 455

In 2013 Matthew Elder and seven codefendants were indicted for conspiring to traffic methamphetamine from Arizona to southwest Indiana; Elder and his father Bill Elder went to trial while others pled guilty.
Coconspirator testimony (notably Michael Curinga, Michael Clark, Lauri Cupp, and Terry Ward) described repeated transactions in which Elder obtained multi‑pound methamphetamine shipments (money exchanged in coolers) and distributed them through the conspiracy.
Cupp testified that Bill and Ward complained Elder shorted them on a December 2012 delivery; the district court admitted this under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
A jury convicted Elder of conspiracy to distribute 50+ grams of methamphetamine and 500+ grams of a methamphetamine mixture under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
At sentencing the government filed a § 851 information alleging two prior Arizona drug convictions (1997 paraphernalia, 1999 manufacture equipment) and the district court concluded those were “felony drug offenses” under § 841, imposing a mandatory life sentence.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, upheld admission of Cupp’s testimony, found the evidence sufficient, but vacated the life sentence because Elder’s 1997 paraphernalia conviction was not punishable by more than one year at the time and thus did not qualify as a § 841 ‘‘felony drug offense.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Cupp’s testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)	Elder: statements were not “in furtherance” of the conspiracy and thus hearsay	Government: statements about being shorted affected conspiracy operations and prompted reorganization, thus in furtherance	Court: Admitted — statements were part of the information flow that furthered the conspiracy; no abuse of discretion
Sufficiency of the evidence to support conspiracy conviction	Elder: testimony was from biased, unreliable coconspirators and had inconsistencies (e.g., 3.5 oz vs 3.5 lbs)	Government: multiple coconspirators described large‑quantity deals, deliveries, and purchases; credibility for jury	Court: Affirmed — viewing evidence in government’s favor, testimony was sufficient for a rational juror to convict
Whether 1997 Arizona paraphernalia conviction counts as a § 841 ‘‘felony drug offense’’	Elder: 1997 offense was punishable by at most one year at time of conviction, so it cannot qualify	Government: argued the prior convictions qualified (conceded error on appeal as to 1997 conviction)	Court: Vacated sentence — 1997 conviction did not carry >1 year maximum at the time, so mandatory life was improper

United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2000) (explains coconspirator statement ‘‘in furtherance’’ analysis)
United States v. Cruz‑Rea, 626 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2010) (‘‘in furtherance’’ need not be exclusive or primary)
United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2009) (statements as part of ordinary information flow among conspirators)
United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2009) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (elements required to prove conspiracy)
United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154 (7th Cir. 1994) (essence of conspiracy is agreement to commit unlawful act)
United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (burden for insufficiency challenges)
United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996) (credibility determinations are for the jury)
United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995) (conspiracy conviction may rest on testimony of an admitted liar)
United States v. Bradley, 165 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 1999) (drug users/sellers as competent lay witnesses to drug identity)