United States v. Elain Young
753 F.3d 757
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Young married Griesbauer, purchased >$1.1M life insurance naming herself beneficiary, refinanced the family farm and obtained an extra $10,000 within 24 hours before Griesbauer’s March 2006 death. Mock visited Young repeatedly in the days before the killing and was seen at Young’s farm the night of the death.
- Griesbauer was shot to death; Young’s lever‑action 30‑30 rifle was the murder weapon; a shell casing, a ski mask (purchased by Mock), gloves with Mock’s DNA and gunshot residue were found near the scene. Young and Mock made matching initial statements to police and were the only persons present.
- Witnesses (Newlin, Eschmann, Goodwin, jailhouse informant Bax, Ballard, Keri and Thomas) testified to prior solicitations, Young’s statements about wanting Griesbauer dead for insurance/farm reasons, Mock’s solicitations for a paid killer, and other contextual facts.
- Police later found a photocopied note in a purse in Young’s truck referencing a $10,000 offer, using a drugged person as a fall‑guy, and collaborating a story.
- Young and Mock were convicted after a joint six‑day jury trial of conspiracy to commit murder‑for‑hire (18 U.S.C. § 1958) and murder‑for‑hire resulting in death; each sentenced to concurrent life terms. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (Newlin, Eschmann, Goodwin) | Young: testimony was propensity evidence, remote or irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial | Gov: prior acts were intrinsic or admissible under 404(b) to show motive, intent, plan, knowledge and to ‘complete the story’ | Affirmed — Newlin admissible under 404(b) (similar plan, motive, close in time); Eschmann and Goodwin treated as intrinsic, properly admitted; limiting instruction and 403 balancing acceptable |
| Admission of coconspirator statements (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)) | Young: no independent corroboration of a conspiracy so statements should not be admissible against her | Gov: independent circumstantial evidence (911 call, joint alibi, mask, DNA, finances, note, Bax) corroborates conspiracy; court may conditionally admit | Affirmed — sufficient independent evidence by preponderance; conditional admission proper |
| Confrontation Clause (Deputy Salsberry relaying Mock’s alibi) | Young: admission of Mock’s out‑of‑court statements violated Sixth Amendment (no cross‑examination) | Gov: statements were not offered for their truth but to show a common/aligned alibi (non‑hearsay), so Crawford does not bar them | Affirmed — statements used to show they coordinated accounts (non‑hearsay), so no Confrontation violation |
| Authentication of photocopied note found in Young’s purse | Young: note was not properly authenticated; ownership/author uncertain | Mock/Gov: contents + location in purse + circumstantial context link note to Young and the crime; low threshold for authentication met | Affirmed — sufficient circumstantial authentication; even if error, admission harmless given other evidence |
| Exclusion of Young’s inconsistent second statement (Mock’s proffer to elicit Sheriff Clark testimony) | Mock: court improperly excluded testimony showing Young’s later conflicting account that would support Mock’s ‘fall guy’ defense | Gov: trial court’s ruling was provisional; Mock failed to renew; appellate review waived or, at most, plain‑error which is not met given overwhelming evidence | Affirmed — issue not preserved; plain‑error review fails because evidence of guilt was overwhelming |
| Denial of severance (Rule 14) | Young/Mock: joint trial prejudiced each (mutually antagonistic defenses, taint from Young’s sexual evidence, note admissibility) | Gov: joint trial appropriate for coconspirators; limiting instructions given; no severe prejudice | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; no showing severance would likely have changed outcome |
| Batson challenges to prosecution’s peremptories | Defs: prosecution struck African‑American jurors for discriminatory reasons | Gov: provided race‑neutral reasons (demeanor, employment at rehabilitative center, confusing answers, hesitancy) | Affirmed — trial court’s demeanor credibility findings not clearly erroneous; race‑neutral justifications sufficient |
| Sufficiency of evidence on “for hire” (consideration/bargained exchange) under § 1958 | Defs: no proof Young promised or paid Mock; mere expectation insufficient | Gov: circumstantial proof (solicitations via Keri/Thomas, Young’s extra $10,000, prior solicitation to Newlin for $10,000, Mock’s financial statements, overlap at scene) supports inference of promise to pay $10,000 | Affirmed — reasonable jury could infer a promise/consideration; evidence sufficient to sustain convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (404(b) threshold: relevance to material issue beyond character)
- Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (standard for admitting coconspirator statements by preponderance, independent corroboration)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (severance only required on showing of compelling, severe prejudice)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory strikes based on race prohibited)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (trial court must assess juror demeanor and give reasons on the record in Batson inquiries)
- United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134 (8th Cir. 1996) (§ 1958 punishes use of interstate facilities with intent that murder‑for‑hire occur; statute’s limited scope)
- United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard for abuse of discretion review on 404(b) admission)
- United States v. Jourdain, 433 F.3d 652 (8th Cir. 2006) (factors for admissibility of other‑acts evidence)
- United States v. Ragland, 555 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2009) (need for independent evidence when admitting coconspirator statements)