United States v. Edward McCain
974 F.3d 506
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2008, Edward McCain (age 17) murdered one victim and attempted to murder another; he pleaded guilty in federal court and was sentenced in 2010 to mandatory life imprisonment (equivalent to life without parole). McCain’s convictions included witness tampering by murder (18 U.S.C. §1512) and a §924(c)/§924(j) firearm murder count.
- After Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, McCain moved under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (pro se) to vacate/resentence; the Government consented to resentencing. The district court appointed counsel and ordered a neuropsychological evaluation.
- At resentencing the court held a three-day hearing, received expert testimony diagnosing antisocial personality disorder and ADHD, reviewed McCain’s juvenile record and extensive postconviction prison misconduct (including stabbings and a sexual assault while awaiting resentencing).
- McCain sought a term-of-years or a “de facto parole” mechanism (periodic judicial review). The Government urged life imprisonment. The district court considered the Miller factors, §3553(a) factors, and postconviction conduct, and again imposed life sentences concurrent across counts.
- On appeal McCain argued (1) procedural and substantive unreasonableness under Miller/Montgomery and §3553(a); and (2) that the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte vacating his §1512 conviction because §1512 then carried only death or mandatory life.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed: it held the resentencing procedurally and substantively reasonable, rejected McCain’s parole-request argument, and concluded any error in leaving the §1512 conviction would not have affected substantial rights because a life sentence was authorized by the §924(j) conviction alone.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte vacating McCain’s §1512 murder conviction because §1512 authorized only death or mandatory life for juveniles | McCain: §1512 then carried only death or mandatory life; after Miller/Montgomery the court should have vacated that conviction | Government: Even if error occurred, Count Five (§924(j)) independently authorized a life term and the court would not have sentenced differently | Affirmed — any assumed error did not affect substantial rights because Count Five alone supported a (nonmandatory) life sentence and the record shows no reasonable probability of a different result |
| Whether resentencing was procedurally reasonable under Miller and §3553(a) (did the court adequately consider youth-related factors and alternative sentences) | McCain: Court overemphasized adult diagnosis and postconviction misconduct and failed to give sufficient weight to juvenility; court did not adequately address his request for "de facto parole" | Government: Court conducted a thorough multi-day hearing, considered Miller factors, §3553(a), expert reports, juvenile records, and explained rejection of de facto parole as unauthorized | Affirmed — district court satisfied procedural requirements, considered juvenile characteristics, and permissibly rejected de facto parole as not authorized by law |
| Whether life without parole was substantively reasonable under Miller/Montgomery (was McCain among the rare juveniles whose crime reflects "irreparable corruption") | McCain: His youth, background, and relative lack of rehabilitative opportunities weigh against life without parole | Government: Aggravating facts, juvenile record, antisocial personality disorder, and serious postconviction violence show permanent incorrigibility | Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; evidence supported finding of irreparable corruption and life sentence was not substantively unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (held mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional; requires sentencer to consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced a substantive rule applicable retroactively; life without parole unconstitutional for all but the rare juvenile whose crime reflects irreparable corruption)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
- United States v. Under Seal, 819 F.3d 715 (4th Cir.) (discussing limits on prosecuting/transferring juveniles where statute prescribes only death or life; remedial distinctions)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (sentencing review standard — procedural and substantive reasonableness; deferential abuse-of-discretion review)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (sentencing court must set forth enough to show it considered parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (postconviction rehabilitation and conduct may be highly relevant at resentencing)
- United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir.) (witness tampering by murder is a categorical crime of violence under §924(c) force clause, addressing related challenges)
- United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. en banc) (postconviction conduct is a critical component of Miller resentencing analysis)