United States v. Edward Jones, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9662

In July–August 2012 Appellant Edward Jones participated in a 17‑kg cocaine purchase (the "Kirkley Hotel Transaction") and was arrested in Lynchburg; law enforcement seized roughly $570,000.
On October 10, 2012 Jones pled guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and was sentenced to 135 months.
In July 2014 Jones was indicted in the Western District of Virginia for a broader conspiracy alleging Jones led a Lynchburg drug trafficking organization distributing over 1,000 kg of cocaine from 1998–2012 (the "Lynchburg Conspiracy").
Jones moved to dismiss the Western District indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the Kirkley Hotel plea was part of the single, larger Lynchburg conspiracy; the district court denied the motion, finding the transactions materially different in scope and duration.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo, applied the totality‑of‑circumstances test for successive conspiracy prosecutions (examining time, offense, place, co‑conspirators, and overt acts), and found substantial overlap such that double jeopardy barred the Western District prosecution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether double jeopardy bars a follow‑on prosecution for conspiracy when a defendant previously pled guilty to a single overt act that fall[s] within a larger alleged conspiracy	The Kirkley Hotel plea was an overt act within the same single, ongoing Lynchburg conspiracy; successive prosecution divides one conspiracy into two and is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause	The Kirkley transaction was a distinct, single‑occasion conspiracy (different object/scope, different co‑conspirators and time span) and thus separate from the 14‑year Lynchburg Conspiracy	Reversed: double jeopardy bars the Western District prosecution because the five‑factor totality test shows substantial (indeed near complete) overlap and the government effectively split one large conspiracy into two

United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming double jeopardy bar where a later prosecution recapitulated an earlier conviction that comprised an overt act of a larger conspiracy)
United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1986) (establishing multi‑factor totality test for distinguishing distinct conspiracies)
United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying totality of circumstances and warning against prosecutorial division of a single conspiracy)
United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992) (describing defendant’s initial burden to show substantial overlap and the government’s burden to prove separate conspiracies)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (holding that one cannot avoid double jeopardy by dividing a single crime into temporal or spatial units)