United States v. Edward Dorsey, Sr., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13305

Edward Dorsey, previously resentenced to time served under the Fair Sentencing Act after Dorsey v. United States, violated supervised release and was charged with three new crack-distribution counts.
In the new case (present case), Judge Colin S. Bruce sentenced Dorsey to 276 months and eight years supervised release; Dorsey appealed.
Separately, Dorsey’s supervised-release revocation was adjudicated by Chief Judge James A. Shadid, who imposed 51 months to run concurrently with the 276-month sentence.
On appeal the first sentence was vacated and remanded; at resentencing Judge Bruce increased Dorsey’s sentence to 327 months, explaining he had expected the 51-month revocation term to be consecutive and increased the sentence to correct that misunderstanding.
Dorsey appealed again, arguing (1) Judge Bruce should have recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) because of prior service as a supervisory AUSA, and (2) resentencing was procedurally flawed because the court improperly considered the revocation sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3)	Dorsey: Judge Bruce’s prior supervisory AUSA role in the U.S. Attorney’s Office required recusal	Judge Bruce: Could not have participated in the present proceeding as an AUSA because he was a judge before the indictment; no actual prior participation	No plain‑error; recusal not required—impossible Bruce had participated in the current proceeding as AUSA
Procedural error in considering revocation sentence at resentencing	Dorsey: A separate judge’s decision (the revocation court’s concurrent sentence) cannot be used to increase his resentencing term	Government/Judge: Federal sentencing law permits consideration of postsentencing and background information; judge explained § 3553(a) reasoning	No procedural error; court permissibly considered postsentencing information and articulated reasons for the 51‑month increase

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (U.S. 2012) (held Fair Sentencing Act applies to post‑FSA sentencing of pre‑FSA offenders)
United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015) (governs aspects of resentencing procedure cited by parties)
United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 2010) (de novo review for preserved § 455(b) claims)
United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001) (plain‑error standard for § 455 claims raised on appeal)
United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015) (discusses standards applied to recusal challenges)
United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2015) (recusal required where judge had actually participated as counsel in the same proceeding)
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (U.S. 1997) (§ 3661 permits broad consideration of information at sentencing)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (U.S. 2011) (postsentencing information may be considered at resentencing)
United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2011) (applies Pepper principle in Seventh Circuit)