United States v. Eduardo Rangel-Castaneda
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4638
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Rangel-Castaneda was convicted in Tennessee court of aggravated statutory rape under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(c) for intercourse with a sixteen-year-old girlfriend who was twelve years younger.
- He later pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in federal court and was deported to Mexico in 2009, returning to the U.S. unlawfully in North Carolina.
- At sentencing, the district court applied the sixteen-level crime-of-violence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on the Tennessee conviction.
- The court granted a four-level departure, resulting in a 37–46 month range and sentenced him to 42 months.
- The district court also considered forcible sex offense and sexual abuse of a minor as alternative predicates for the enhancement.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the Tennessee statute is overbroad and does not categorically fit the generic statutory rape definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee § 39-13-506(c) fits the generic statutory rape definition for § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). | Rangel-Castaneda. | Government claims Tennessee matches generic statutory rape (age 18). | Overbroad; generic statutory rape age is sixteen, not eighteen. |
| Whether the state statute can be a forcible sex offense under the note to § 2L1.2(c)(1)(iii). | Rangel-Castaneda. | Statutory rape can be forcible where consent is invalid due to age. | Not permissible; Tennessee statute does not require forcible conduct. |
| Whether the enhancement can be satisfied by sexual abuse of a minor or aggravated felonylanguage. | Rangel-Castaneda. | Either predicate could apply under § 2L1.2. | Sixteen-level enhancement cannot be applied under these predicates for Tennessee statute. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (generic, contemporary meaning governs when interpreting enhancements)
- Rodríguez-Guzmán, 506 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2007) (statutory rape generally defined at sixteen for generic purposes)
- United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012) (modified categorical approach applicable when statute is divisible)
- United States v. Chacón, 533 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2008) (interpreted 'forcible' in forcible sex offenses as requiring compulsion)
- Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (defined 'sexual abuse of a minor' with respect to age thresholds)
- United States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1991) (sentencing uniformity under the categorical approach)