United States v. Edmundson
153 F. Supp. 3d 857
D. Maryland2015Background
- Tiffany Edmundson pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and a § 924(c) firearm offense on Feb. 11, 2013; sentencing was postponed.
- In Aug. 2015 she moved to dismiss Count 2 (§ 924(c) firearm charge) and to vacate her plea to that count, later withdrawing the plea-withdrawal request but pressing dismissal of Count 2.
- Edmundson argued Hobbs Act conspiracy lacks an element of use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force, so it cannot qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A), and that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson v. United States.
- The court held at a Dec. 17, 2015 hearing that Hobbs Act conspiracy does not satisfy the § 924(c) force clause and that the § 924(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
- The court requested supplemental briefing on whether, despite Edmundson’s withdrawn motion to withdraw her plea, Count 2 must be dismissed because no lawful ground for a § 924(c) sentence remains; sentencing was set for Jan. 13, 2016.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act conspiracy is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Edmundson: Hobbs Act conspiracy lacks an element requiring use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force, so it cannot qualify under the force clause | Government: (implicitly) § 924(c) should reach the predicate; argued differences from other statutes | Court: Hobbs Act conspiracy does not have as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force and therefore does not qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson | Edmundson: The § 924(c) residual clause suffers the same double-indeterminacy as the ACC residual clause and is void for vagueness | Government: § 924(c) residual clause differs from the ACC residual clause (lacks listed comparator offenses) and is therefore not necessarily vague | Court: § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson because it requires an abstract "ordinary case" risk inquiry and a vague threshold for how much risk is "substantial" |
| Whether Count 2 must be dismissed prior to sentencing given those holdings | Edmundson: If neither clause applies, there is no legal basis to impose § 924(c) punishment and the count should be dismissed | Government: (argued for sentencing under § 924(c) or other grounds) | Court: Ordered briefing on whether dismissal is required and deferred final ruling to sentencing date |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACC residual clause unconstitutionally vague because it asks courts to imagine an "ordinary case" and to apply an indeterminate risk standard)
- United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2009) (held conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon did not have as an element the use of physical force for ACC/force-clause analysis)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluded statute with language identical to § 924(c) residual clause was unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson)
- United States v. Melvin, [citation="621 F. App'x 226"] (4th Cir. 2015) (vacated ACC-based enhancement where conspiracy convictions did not qualify under ACC force or residual clauses)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explains the categorical approach and the divisible-offense exception used in force-clause analyses)