United States v. Edelman
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16515
| 2d Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant Jody Edelman had a 1993 federal conviction with supervised release; after state parole issues he agreed to modified supervised release requiring residence at a DOJ-designated residential reentry center (halfway house) for five months and to warrantless searches by probation or assisting officers.
- While resident at the Syracuse Pavilion halfway house, Pavilion rules restricted movement, required sign-outs, and authorized searches of residents and property.
- Edelman left the Pavilion without authorization on August 29, 2008 and was arrested on October 2, 2008; officers found keys linking him to Apartment 509, entered with the lessee’s consent (no warrant), observed contraband in plain view, obtained a search warrant, and later seized additional evidence and cash.
- A federal indictment charged Edelman with three drug counts (possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base) and one count of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) based on his departure from the halfway house.
- Edelman moved to dismiss the escape count (arguing the halfway house was not “custody” and/or not custody “by virtue of a conviction”) and moved to suppress evidence seized from Apartment 509 (arguing Fourth Amendment violation); the district court denied both motions, a jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Edelman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether residence in a halfway house as a condition of supervised release is “custody” under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) | Halfway-house residency, though less restrictive than imprisonment, imposes restraints sufficient to qualify as custody | Pavilion residence is not custody for § 751(a) because it is not equivalent to incarceration | Court held it is custody for § 751(a); constrained movement and supervisory conditions suffice |
| Whether placement in the halfway house was “by virtue of . . . [a] conviction of any offense” under § 751(a) | Modifications and post-revocation conditions flow from the original conviction and are part of the original sentence | Placement was a modification of supervised release, not a new punishment tied to a conviction | Court held placement was attributable to the original conviction and thus satisfies the “by virtue of” language |
| Whether evidence seized from Apartment 509 should be suppressed because Edelman had a reasonable expectation of privacy | No reasonable expectation of privacy given waiver of searches as a supervised-release condition and diminished privacy after escape | Edelman had a privacy interest in the apartment and the warrantless entry/observations violated the Fourth Amendment | Court held Edelman’s expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable (waivers and escape curtailed privacy); suppression denied |
| Whether the rule of lenity or ambiguity in § 751(a) precludes conviction | Statute covers “any custody”; language is broad enough to proscribe conduct | Ambiguity favors lenity; halfway-house custody is unclear and should be construed narrowly | Court rejected lenity; found no grievous statutory ambiguity and applied a broad interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.) (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Sack, 379 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir.) (halfway-house residence can be custody for escape statute)
- United States v. Rudinsky, 439 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.) (community treatment center residence constituted custody)
- United States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.) (pretrial halfway-house residence not custody under § 751(a))
- United States v. Burke, 694 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.) (halfway-house placement after supervised-release violation not custody)
- United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908 (4th Cir.) (supervised-release revocation and related penalties are part of original sentence)
- United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.) (rule of lenity applied only where grievous statutory ambiguity exists)
- United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir.) (waivers in supervised-release context significantly diminish expectation of privacy)
- United States v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.) (escape does not expand a fugitive’s diminished privacy expectations)