United States v. Eddie Griffin
701 F. App'x 876
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Eddie Griffin pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy and Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- The plea agreement included a sentence-appeal waiver: Griffin waived appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 except where the sentence exceeded statutory maximums, resulted from an upward departure/variance, or if the government appealed; Griffin acknowledged discussing the waiver with counsel.
- At the plea colloquy the district court recited the waiver, asked if Griffin understood the terms, and Griffin said he did; the court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.
- At sentencing the court designated Griffin a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, raising the guideline range; the court varied below that range and imposed a total sentence of 216 months (132 months concurrent on Hobbs counts plus 84 months consecutive on the § 924(c) count).
- Griffin appealed arguing the 216-month sentence was substantively unreasonable and contended the appeal waiver was unenforceable because the plea transcript showed he did not understand the waiver’s full significance.
- The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the waiver; the Eleventh Circuit evaluated whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether it barred Griffin’s substantive-reasonableness challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of sentence-appeal waiver | Griffin: waiver unenforceable because plea colloquy shows he did not understand full significance | Government: waiver was knowing and voluntary; bars appeal | Waiver enforceable — court specifically questioned Griffin; record shows understanding |
| Whether failure to be told waiver bars challenge to career-offender status defeats waiver | Griffin: not told he’d be barred from challenging career-offender determination, so waiver invalid as to that issue | Government: plea agreement warned possibility of career-offender status; waiver covers challenges to guideline range | Waiver covers such challenges; pre-sentencing uncertainty does not invalidate waiver |
| Whether substantive-reasonableness challenge fits an exception to the waiver | Griffin: sentence was greater than necessary; thus appeal should be allowed | Government: substantive-reasonableness claim falls within waived rights and not within exceptions | Court: claim barred by enforceable waiver; dismissal granted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for appeal-waiver validity)
- United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (appeal waivers enforced if knowing and voluntary; waivers include difficult or debatable issues)
- United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) (waiver valid if court questions defendant about waiver at plea colloquy or record shows defendant understood its significance)
- United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (waiver includes appellate challenges even where sentencing issues are vigorously disputed)
Dismissal: The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Griffin’s appeal under the enforceable appeal waiver; appeal dismissed.
