United States v. Eddie Fluker
891 F.3d 541
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- Eddie Dean Fluker was originally convicted in 1992 in the Western District of Virginia on drug and firearms charges tied to Virginia conduct; he was sentenced as an armed career criminal and received a multi‑hundred month term.
- After Johnson and Welch, Fluker pursued and won a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion vacating his sentence because the ACCA residual clause was invalid; the case was remanded for resentencing.
- On resentencing, the probation officer designated Fluker a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two Georgia robbery convictions, and the district court used the 1991 Guidelines Manual (to avoid ex post facto concerns) to calculate a Guidelines range.
- Fluker objected: he argued Georgia robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the 2016 Guidelines definition, so he should not be a career offender and the court should use the 2016 Manual.
- The district court overruled the objection, allowed a victim‑witness (Officer Caldwell) to testify at resentencing, and imposed a 308‑month sentence.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit concluded Georgia robbery is broader than generic robbery under the controlling definition and thus is not a § 4B1.2(a)(2) crime of violence; the Court vacated and remanded for resentencing and rejected the Government’s mootness argument.
Issues
| Issue | Fluker’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia robbery is a "crime of violence" for career‑offender purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) | Georgia robbery is broader than generic robbery (because it allows "sudden snatching") and thus does not qualify | Georgia robbery can qualify in some instances; district court relied on circuit precedent and an Eleventh Circuit decision | Held: Georgia robbery is broader than the Fourth Circuit’s definition of generic robbery (Gattis) and therefore is not an enumerated "robbery" predicate; career‑offender designation was erroneous |
| Whether the court should have used the 1991 or 2016 Guidelines Manual to compute the range | Use 2016 Manual because career‑offender designation is invalid; no ex post facto problem | District court used 1991 Manual to avoid ex post facto concerns | Held: Because career‑offender status was improper, there was no ex post facto issue and the 2016 Manual should have been used; procedural error requires vacatur and remand |
| Mootness: whether appeal is moot because Fluker is no longer serving the Virginia sentence | Fluker’s Virginia sentence still affects the start and duration of a consecutive Florida sentence; thus a live interest remains | Argues BOP records show Virginia term ended and current custody is solely for unrelated Florida sentence, so claim is moot | Held: Not moot—Florida sentence was expressly ordered consecutive to the Virginia term, so relief could change Fluker’s release date; case remains justiciable |
| Admissibility of new witness at resentencing (Officer Caldwell) | Objected that new victim testimony was improper because Caldwell did not testify at original sentencing | Government allowed to call witnesses at a full resentencing following § 2255 relief | Held: No abuse of discretion—at a full resentencing the court may consider new evidence and call witnesses; testimony was permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Johnson error is retroactive on collateral review)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (using a higher Guidelines range at sentencing than the edition in effect at the time of offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause)
- United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (adopts the Fourth Circuit’s definition of generic robbery requiring circumstances involving immediate danger to the person)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explains the categorical/divisible‑statute framework for determining whether prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses)
